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Introduction1
by PASQUALE ANNICCHINO
The right to freedom of religion or belief (FORB) 
is one of the most discussed and debated in the 
international and national arena. This is even 
truer when FORB meets foreign policy. When 
States advance FORB through foreign policy, what 
exactly do they aim to protect and to promote? 
When states “engage” religion through foreign 
policy, what, and who, exactly are they engaging? 
These questions might seem tautological, but they 
are central both to academic and policy debates 
today. This is not only a problem in the United 
States, though it has served as a model in many 
instances. The European Union, Canada Italy and 
other states are all considering – and some are 
already implementing – specific policies aimed 
at fostering the protection and the promotion of 
FORB and other forms of engagement in their for-
eign policies.
These actions, and the interests that they reflect, 
raise important questions. In some sense, as 
Lorenzo Zucca has argued: “The most obvious 
problem is that action is guided not by an inter-
national-universal understanding of the Human 
Right to Freedom of Religion, but rather by a very 
domestic one”2. This may not be peculiar to free-
dom or religion or belief, of course. More impor-
tantly, as Thomas Farr has recognized, in the case 
of the United States: “Notwithstanding the hard, 
1. Part of this introduction is taken from my contribu-
tion to “The Immanent Frame” post “Engaging Religion 
at the Department of State”, 30/07/2013, available at: 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2013/07/30/engaging-religion-
at-the-department-of-state/. The workshop took place 
at the EUI on November 17th 2012.
2. See L. Zucca, Prince or Pariah? The Place of Freedom 
of Religion in a System of International Human Rights, 
ReligioWest working papers, RSCAS 2013/26, p. 15.
creative work of the State Department’s Office of 
International Religious Freedom, it would be dif-
ficult to name a single country in the world over 
the past fifteen years where American religious 
freedom policy has helped to reduce religious per-
secution or to increase religious freedom in any 
substantial or sustained way”3. If this is the case – 
and coming from one of the most vocal advocates 
of U.S. religious freedom – then what exactly is 
this global trend to protect religious freedom and 
engage religion about? What exactly is being pro-
tected, and engaged, by whom, and with what con-
sequences? While there is no shortage of imme-
diate action in this policy domain, we really don’t 
know what the long-run consequences of these 
initiatives will be. And it remains to be seen how 
our conception of the right itself, as well as what it 
means to protect it through law, will change over 
time. The contributions collected in this work rep-
resent the result of an exchange between academ-
ics and policy-makers on this important topic. 
In the first part, Lorenzo Zucca, Frederick Mark 
Gedicks, and Hegumen Philip Ryabykh offer three 
distinct and different theoretical reflections on the 
understanding of the right to freedom of religion 
or belief at a general level and also in the crucial 
distinction between the right understood as an 
individual right and as a collective one. In the sec-
ond part Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Jeremy Gunn, 
and Matt Nelson deal with the political implica-
tion of the protection and promotion of religious 
freedom in foreign policy. The third part collects 
the contribution of policy-makers both from the 
United States and Europe. The recent initiatives 
3. T. Farr, Examining the Government’s record on Imple-
menting the International Religious Freedom Act, Tes-
timony before the House Committee on Oversight 
and Government Reform-SubCommittee on National 
Security, June 13th, 2013, p. 3 available at: http://reposi-
tory.berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/130613FarrTest-
imonyExaminingGovernmentsRecordImplementingI
nternationalReligiousFreedomAct.pdf
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of the European Union are analyzed through the 
contribution of Jean Bernard Bolvin – from the 
European External Action Service – and Denis De 
Jong, which deals with the role of the European 
Parliament in the development of an EU foreign 
policy on freedom of religion or belief. Elizabeth 
K. Cassidy reviews the United States’ approach to 
the promotion of international religious freedom, 
and Pasquale Ferrara deals with the recent Italian 
initiative in the field. 
The contributions offer material for reflection on 
a topic that has recently gained international rel-
evance, a trend that is also illustrated by the recent 
approval by the Council of the European Union of 
the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protec-
tion of freedom of religion or belief4 and by the 
establishment of a new State Department office 
of Faith-Based Community Initiatives in the 
United States5. Knowing that establishing dialogue 
between academics and policy makers is not an 
easy task, we hope to continue along the road we 
have begun with this initiative.
4. EU Foreign Affairs Council, EU Guidelines on the pro-
motion and protection of freedom of religion or belief 
, 24 June 2013.
5. See http://www.state.gov/s/fbci/
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1 
The Protection 
and Promotion 
of Freedom 
of Religion 
or Belief in 
Foreign Policy: 
Three Puzzles.
by LORENZO ZUCCA6
Introduction
The human right to freedom of religion is inter-
preted in radically different ways in the West. 
Some insist that religious people should be pro-
tected from external interferences, while others 
insist that non-religious people should be pro-
tected from the interference of religion in public 
affairs. Perhaps the problem is that it is impossible 
to accurately define the human right to freedom of 
religion (HRFR). Some call this problem – in my 
view, correctly – the ‘impossibility’ of the human 
right to freedom of religion.7 If this is correct, then 
6. Reader in Jurisprudence, King’s College London
7. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Reli-
gious Freedom, ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2007).
the practical implication is immense: no interna-
tional action is justified in the name of the HRFR, 
since every action is bound to amount to the uni-
lateral imposition of a conception of freedom of 
religion which does not meet with the understand-
ing of the people who are supposed to be rescued 
in the name of the HRFR. 
The first interesting thing to note is that the impos-
sibility of HRFR is true both in secular states and 
in Theocracies. So for example, the Iranian Con-
stitution entrenches the immutable establishment 
of Islam (Art. 12),8 and only recognizes a handful 
of other religions as official minorities who have 
a qualified freedom to perform their rites and 
ceremonies (Art. 13).9 Interestingly, the Iranian 
Constitution recognizes that other non-Muslims 
are owed respect for their human rights (art. 14).10 
But if one reads Articles 13 and 14 together, one 
may conclude that only a few official religious 
minorities have a qualified freedom of religion. 
Other non-Muslims may see their human rights 
respected, but amongst these human rights, we 
must infer that there is no HRFR. 
8. Art. 12: The official religion of Iran is Islam and the 
Twelver Ja’fari school [in usual al-Din and fiqh], and 
this principle will remain eternally immutable. […]
9. Art. 13: Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are 
the only recognized religious minorities, who, within 
the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious 
rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own 
canon in matters of personal affairs and religious edu-
cation.
10. Art. 14: In accordance with the sacred verse; (“God 
does not forbid you to deal kindly and justly with those 
who have not fought against you because of your reli-
gion and who have not expelled you from your homes” 
[60:8]), the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and all Muslims are duty-bound to treat non-Muslims 
in conformity with ethical norms and the principles of 
Islamic justice and equity, and to respect their human 
rights. This principle applies to all who refrain from 
engaging in conspiracy or activity against Islam and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The HRFR, more importantly, is not univocally 
recognized in western secular states. Some con-
stitutions accord it a prominent place (US), while 
others give it a very limited position: the French 
Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citi-
zen (DRMC), for example, contains a very limited 
recognition.11
The first amendment of the American Constitu-
tion accords a much more generous place to free-
dom of religion, and attaches to it a very articu-
lated protection via the first amendment.12 While 
the American Constitution carves out a clear 
place in its text, the French Declaration laconically 
acknowledges that opinions, even religious ones, 
benefit from the protection against prosecution. 
And it is only by way of analogy that we can infer 
that freedom of expression of thought and opin-
ions also covers religious people. It is important to 
stress that this freedom of opinion is very impor-
tant, but that it in no way amounts to an indepen-
dent HRFR. 
If it is already complicated to determine the nature 
of human rights, the question becomes even more 
challenging in relation to the HRFR. A judge or a 
policy-maker who attempts to apply this right, will 
need to understand the whole system of human 
rights and how it ranks different interests within it, 
11. Art. X: Nul ne doit être inquiété pour ses opinions, 
même religieuses, pourvu que leur manifestation ne 
trouble pas l’ordre public établi par la Loi. Article XI 
La libre communication des pensées et des opinions 
est un des droits les plus précieux de l’Homme : tout 
Citoyen peut donc parler, écrire, imprimer librement, 
sauf à répondre de l’abus de cette liberté, dans les cas 
déterminés par la Loi.
12. Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.
the proper meaning of a freedom and how to limit 
it, and finally, will have to specify the object of that 
freedom, which is particularly difficult in relation 
to religion. If the core case of the right to life is 
a prohibition of killing, then it is not as straight-
forward to determine the central correlative duty 
in relation to the protection of a human right to 
freedom of religion. 
Moreover, the question: ‘what is religion?’ for the 
purpose of determining the right holders and the 
content of the right is an altogether different ques-
tion from ‘what is speech?’ Secular institutions 
are notoriously ill-equipped to answer the former 
question. This is partly because secular institu-
tions do not have the theological training required 
to examine the problem. Partly, it is because secu-
lar law encapsulates an understanding of evidence 
that is not compatible with the proofs that reli-
gious people may advance in order to establish 
the genuine nature of their beliefs. Further, the 
question: ‘what is religion?’ can be broken down 
in many difficult quandaries. The broadest under-
lying problem concerns the kind of object that 
religion is, that is, its nature, or its ontology, so to 
speak. 
I am not going to attempt an answer to the broad 
question here, but I will highlight three puzzles 
that flow from this general quandary. Firstly, I deal 
with the problem of scope of the HRFR: how do 
we determine its extent, and what does it cover? 
Secondly, I deal with the problem of strength: is 
the interest protected more or less important than 
other interests that are constitutionally protected? 
Thirdly, what happens when this interest clashes 
with other interests protected by other rights? 
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I. Scope
To determine the scope of the protection afforded 
by a human right, one must engage in several dif-
ferent steps. Firstly, one must translate the broad 
statement of principle into deontic modalities 
(prohibitions/permissions/obligations).13 So, for 
example, the US Constitution prohibits, on one 
hand, the making of laws that establish one reli-
gion, and on the other, the making of laws prohib-
iting the free exercise of one’s own religion (here 
the prohibition of a prohibition must be read as a 
broad permission). 
Secondly, one must establish the correlative duty 
imposed on other people by virtue of the exis-
tence of a right.14 At the constitutional level, gen-
erally speaking, a liberty-right is correlated with 
the absence of the right on the part of other per-
sons. This means very blandly that if I dispose of a 
right to exercise my religion in the private sphere, 
nobody possesses a right to curtail my right by 
violating my private space. Surely the HRFR also 
implies a more general immunity on the part of the 
right-holder, which corresponds with a disability 
on the part of the state. For example, the American 
legislator is the prime duty-bearer of the HRFR, 
and this entails a constitutional disability to make 
laws that prohibit free exercise of religion.
Thirdly, and much more controversially, in order 
to decide the actual scope of prohibitions and the 
extent to which the legislator is disabled, one must 
work out what kind of beliefs and behaviors are 
classified as religious. Looking at both the US and 
French texts, we can readily see that there is great 
difference as to the religiously-inspired behavior 
13. G.H. von Wright, Deontic Logic, Mind, New Series, Vol. 
60, No. 237. (Jan. 1951) 1-15.
14. W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, (Dart-
mouth: Aldershot, 2001).
that is covered by constitutional articles. In the 
US, free exercise forms the core of the protection, 
while in France it is religious belief that is pro-
tected. If we compare the two, there is a striking 
difference between protection of religious thought 
and protection of acts based upon religious beliefs. 
So, the distinction between speech and acts is an 
important dividing line between the regime of 
protection in America and that in France. 
Another possible dividing line, perhaps even 
more important, is between freedom of religion 
understood as an individual or as a collective- 
group- right. The idea of free exercise has been 
interpreted as leaning towards the protection of 
individual conscience rather than the protection 
of religious groups. In fact, on this point, it is clear 
that the American state attempts to avoid support-
ing any religious group as far as possible, even if 
they obviously dispose of the freedom to gather 
to celebrate religious rituals. However, the basis of 
religious assembly can still be found in the indi-
vidual act of conscience, rather than being derived 
from a special status accorded to religious organi-
zations. Thus in the US, religious conscience is the 
basic element for the recognition and protection 
of some religious beliefs and acts. 
In revolutionary France, the text only mentions 
opinions. In both cases, there seems to be an accent 
on the individual experience, but we must draw an 
important distinction between conscience on one 
side, and thought and opinion on the other. Con-
science clearly covers both belief and action, while 
opinions can hardly be stretched to cover actions. 
There is a big difference between conscience and 
thought: the former functions in the manner of a 
sword, whereas thought (or opinion) is more of 
a shield. In other words, once the existence of a 
religious claim of conscience can be established it 
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seems as if an exemption from ordinary law might 
be requested. In the case of religious opinion, the 
only concern seems to center around the creation 
of a private space shielded from the interference of 
ordinary law, but in no way does religious opinion 
seem to be entitled to claim an exemption from 
ordinary law based on religious opinion alone.
It is only with more recent human rights treaties that 
the scope of the right to freedom of religion covers 
a collective aspect. In particular the European Con-
vention of Human Rights, article 9 prescribes: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, prac-
tice and observance. 
The European formulation goes well beyond con-
science and thought, and spans from that individ-
ual dimension to a much more collective one. It 
also moves beyond the private sphere to cover the 
public aspect of religion. 
II. Strenght
In determining the strength of HRFR, one must 
compare the strength of other rights in abstracto; 
it is also necessary to single out the importance of 
religious practices within a society; and finally one 
must compare the freedom of different religious 
groups between themselves. 
Some American commentators see a paradoxi-
cal treatment of religion.15 Free exercise receives 
15. Eisgruber and Sager, Religion and the Constitution, 
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007).
special protection, and thus religious conscience 
has special force in comparison to other claims of 
conscience, whereas establishment is the object of 
special burdens, and therefore religion as a collec-
tive enterprise has less strength than other collec-
tive activities. In France, according to the DRMC, 
religious opinions are protected at the same level 
as other opinions, but certainly not more exten-
sively. So, in this sense, religious opinions receive 
equal treatment. As far as religious groups are 
concerned, France allows itself the possibility to 
interfere with them whenever it deems it suitable. 
In both cases we talk about separation between 
church and state, though in fact in America it is 
bilateral separation, while in France it is unilateral 
separation. 
The ECHR admits of systems of separation and 
establishment, so the strength of the interest pro-
tected by freedom of religion should be evaluated 
in different contexts. However, it is important 
to note one thing at the outset: if one religion is 
established de jure, then it goes without saying 
that there is a presumption of more favorable 
treatment of that religion vis-à-vis others. Estab-
lishment does not promote equality between reli-
gions, and can easily undermine the freedom of all 
other religions. 
So another interesting problem is the following: 
when a state establishes one religion, it may very 
well undermine the freedom of other religions. 
Kokkinakis, the first case to reach the Strasbourg 
court, asserts the freedom of religion of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in Greece, where the Orthodox Church 
is constitutionally established and, as a result of 
that, had made proselytism of other religions a 
criminal offence.16 
16. Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, Judge-
ment of 25 May 1993.
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De jure establishment, however, does not automat-
ically entail that only one religion enjoys the ben-
efit of constitutional protection. In the UK, de jure 
establishment goes hand in hand with a constant 
concern for offering equal benefits to a vast array 
of other religions.17 Conversely, de jure separation 
does not altogether prevent the possibility of de 
facto establishment, or at least a strict collabora-
tion between state and one church, as is the case in 
Italy between the state and the Vatican. This means 
that one religion enjoys very special benefits, while 
others may be treated comparatively much worse. 
For example, freedom of religion for Muslims in 
Italy does not involve great legal protection, or 
public enthusiasm, which results in a series of 
administrative burdens to prevent Muslims from 
building religious places of worship.18 
An important concern one faces when determin-
ing the strength of the interest protected by reli-
gious freedom is the issue of whether or not we 
are talking about equal freedom for all religions or 
whether one religion is treated better than others.19 
The main concern, though, is about the strength 
of the interest of religious freedom within a sys-
tem of plural rights. Religious freedom in the US 
seems at first glance a central concern of the Con-
stitution since it is placed at the very front of the 
bill of rights and is the object of an elaborated set 
of norms. In the French DRMC, however, there is 
no article devoted to religious freedom, and reli-
gion is only mentioned in passing, so it is clear that 
its status, and the strength of the interest resulting 
from it, are much less important. 
17. Julian Rivers, The Law of Organized Religion. Between 
Establishment and Secularism, (Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
18. The ECtHR is going to hear the Swiss case soon on the 
administrative prohibition to build minarets. 
19. Eisgruber and Sager, Religion and the Constitution, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).
In the ECHR, freedom of religion has an inde-
pendent place amongst derogable rights. We know 
that other rights such as freedom from torture, 
and the right to life have a greater strength at least 
insofar that they are to be considered non-dero-
gable, that is to say, there is no interest that can 
prevail over them. A contrario, it is clear that there 
may be a number of interests that can prevail over 
the interests protected by freedom of religion, and 
paragraph 2 of Art. 9 ECHR confirms this:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs 
shall be subject only to such limitations as re 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a dem-
ocratic society in the interests of public safety, 
for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Freedom of religion as embedded in the ECHR 
has a very broad scope, since it covers thought, 
conscience and religion. Thus, it covers both indi-
vidual and collective beliefs and behavior based 
on those beliefs. However, the strength of the right 
is limited and limitable on the grounds of para-
graph 2 of the same Article 9. The strength of the 
interest protected by freedom of religion can be 
limited on the basis of interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morality, 
and finally – last but not least – for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 
It is also important to note at this stage, that scope 
and strength are linked in a relationship of inverse 
proportionality: the wider the scope of protection, 
the lesser the strength, and vice-versa. If the scope 
was very narrow, then one could always argue that 
it was a matter of preserving the very core of the 
right. 
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III. Conflicts
The most difficult cases of limitations are those of 
conflicts between the right to freedom of religion 
and other rights. As pointed out above, and as a 
matter of law, freedom of religion can be limited 
in order to guarantee the promotion and protec-
tion of other rights. Examples of such conflicts are 
multiple, but we cannot discuss them all. Here we 
can only present a few examples. 
Freedom of religion can conflict with other free-
doms, such as, for example, freedom of expression. 
It may be argued that in plural democratic societ-
ies, people are free to express negative judgments 
about religious practices, including judgments that 
are offensive. After all, if protected expression was 
only positive expression, then there would not be 
any need to proclaim such freedom. However, it can 
also be argued that offensive opinions concerning 
religious minorities can undermine the respect of 
the whole community towards religious minorities 
as well as undermining the status of that minor-
ity within a wider society. In other words, offen-
sive speech can easily polarize societies and create 
widespread social tensions within and outside the 
national territory. A common example of this sce-
nario is the Mohammed cartoon saga. 
This issue is, I think, exacerbated all the more if 
we look at the case law of the ECtHR that lim-
ited the artistic expression of a movie director in 
the Otto Preminger case on the grounds that the 
movie could offend the religious majority in the 
Tyrol region.20 The court reasoned that the inter-
ference with the applicant association’s freedom of 
expression was prescribed by law, but the seizure 
and forfeiture of the film were aimed at ‘the pro-
tection of the rights of others’, or more precisely, 
20. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, (13470/87) [1994] 
ECHR 26 (20 September 1994).
the right to respect for one’s religious feelings, and 
to ensure religious peace. The Court assessed the 
conflicting interests of the exercise of two funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed under the Conven-
tion and concluded that the Austrian authorities 
did not overstep their margin of appreciation. It 
is not clear whether the same protection would be 
afforded to religious feelings of a minority as in 
the case of Mohammed cartoons. 
In any event, what matters here is to highlight that 
we have two specific problems: first, one has to 
determine whether the right to respect for one’s 
religious feelings is within the scope of freedom 
of religion. Secondly, whether that right is strong 
enough to prevail over freedom of expression. 
Both questions are determined by the judge, who 
can only rely on her own cultural assumptions 
about the nature and value of religion. 
Another set of conflicts more closely concerns 
the very nature of freedom of religion. It is a mat-
ter of knowing whether religion as an established 
societal practice of institutions can discrimi-
nate between some categories of people who are 
normally protected against discrimination. The 
abstract conflict is between equality and liberty. 
This conflict is particularly difficult, as it may put 
a great pressure on religions to adapt to societal 
standards, which some religions are desperately 
trying to resist. The conflict takes place in many 
different settings. However, the workplace is a per-
fect example of a domain where the fight against 
discrimination has been strong in recent times, at 
least in Europe.21 So, if religion enters the work-
place, the tension between non-discrimination 
and liberty of religion is more visible. 
21. In the USA, the doctrine of ministerial exception bars 
the possibility of applying anti-discrimination laws. 
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There are, in fact, various tensions. The employer 
may be secular, and employees may ask for the 
possibility of wearing religious symbols;22 in this 
case the discrimination is against religious people. 
The employer may also be the state or a public 
authority, and the employee may be in a situa-
tion in which she refuses to carry out basic pub-
lic functions that are at odds with some religious 
precepts, which themselves are discriminatory.23 
Or, the employer may be religious and dismiss 
the employee who does not meet some religious 
standards.24 Assuming that churches can employ 
whomsoever they want, is it possible to fire people 
who no longer meet some religious precepts that 
would normally be seen as discriminatory? 
In other words, when religion engages in secular 
employment contract, does that make the religious 
workplace free from the constraints applicable 
to the non-religious workplace? Again we have 
a problem of scope: to what extent does freedom 
of religion color the activities in which religion 
engages? Further, there is a problem of strength: 
to what extent does the special protection of free-
dom of religion prevail over other constitutionally 
entrenched interests such as non-discrimination? 
The answers to these questions are not written in 
stone, and depend heavily on very contingent and 
22. The cases of Eweida (Eweida v. the United Kingdom 
– no. 48420/10) and Chaplin (Chaplin v. the United 
Kingdom – application no. 59842/10), pending before 
the ECtHR, deal with the restriction on wearing Chris-
tian crosses in the working environment. 
23. The case of Ladele (Ladele v. the United Kingdom – no. 
51671/10), also pending before the ECtHR, deals with 
the dismissal of Ladele following her refusal to register 
civil unions for homosexual people. 
24. Several cases have reached the ECtHR in the last 5 
years. I cite here Lombardi Vallauri, Application No 
39128/05 (20 October 2009), whose employment con-
tract at the catholic university of Milan was terminated 
on the ground that the Congregation of Catholic Edu-
cation refused its approval after 20 years of employ-
ment. 
local understandings of the nature and value of reli-
gion in a discrete society. This simple fact must cau-
tion us against the temptation of acting abroad in 
the name of our own contingent and local convic-
tions about the human right to freedom of religion. 
Conclusion
These brief considerations highlight the puz-
zles that judges and policy-makers necessarily 
face when trying to pin down the meaning of 
the HRFR. This is not to mention the difficulties 
related to conceptions of freedom of religion in 
non-Western states, which are even greater. Those 
puzzles do not have straightforward answers, and 
are dealt with by reference to highly contingent 
and local conceptions of religion that are not likely 
to be universalized. 
When a policy-maker has to grapple with prob-
lems of religious freedom, she is bound to face two 
extraordinarily complicated problems:
1. What is the nature of the right to freedom of 
religion?
2. How does one know what counts as religion 
across the world if one begins from the start-
ing point of one’s local conception of religion?
The second problem is possibly even greater than 
the first. For, if we simply assume that freedom 
of religion deserves international protection, 
the problems begin when policy-makers have to 
assess whether to intervene or not. In light of pre-
vious considerations, one may wonder whether it 
is advisable to single out freedom of religion as 
worthy of special international protection. I hope 
it is clear by now that humility and prudence mili-
tate against intervening abroad in the name of the 
HRFR. Perhaps, it is high time to abandon moral-
izing crusades. 
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2 
Religious 
Group Rights: 
Four Analytic 
Touchstones
by FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS25
Introduction
A group right creates a zone of group autonomy 
within the boundary marked by the right: It walls 
the state out from “internal” group affairs that fall 
within the boundaries of the right, and in that 
sense creates a space within which the group may 
act free of government supervision and control. 
Like individual rights, group rights preserve indi-
vidual liberty by rebuffing government oppression.
But if the state is itself an instrument of liberty 
rather than oppression,26 what then? The group 
right that walls the state out, necessarily walls 
members in, leaving them without the liberating 
protections of the state “outside the walls.” Indi-
25. Guy Anderson Chair & Professor of Law, Brigham 
Young University Law School, Provo, Utah USA. I am 
grateful to Olivier Roy and Pasquale Annicchino for 
the invitation to deliver this paper at the Workshop.
26. See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty 
(1958), in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
vidual group members are then left to the uncer-
tain mercies of the group, without the protections 
against group oppression that the state would oth-
erwise provide. The group right that enables group 
liberty, in other words, also enables individual 
oppression.
After elaborating this paradox and examining it in 
the context of religious groups, I discuss and apply 
four possible dimensions of a potential doctrine 
of religious group rights. I conclude by suggesting 
that the threat to individual liberty calls for cau-
tion rather than enthusiasm in recognizing reli-
gious group rights.
I. The Paradox of (Religious) 
Groups
Groups simultaneously serve liberty-conferring 
and liberty-depriving functions in liberal democ-
racy. Groups are crucial to the creation and main-
tenance of personal meaning and identity; most 
people define who they are by reference to groups 
to which they belong or with which they identify. 
Groups also protect individuals from excesses of 
the contemporary liberal state, before which sin-
gle individuals are largely powerless. And finally, 
groups are an important source of social values, 
which the liberal state is largely constrained from 
developing and promoting itself.
But if the liberal state may excessively intrude 
upon individual liberty, so may private groups. 
The dependence of individuals on group norms 
and narratives for personal meaning leaves them 
vulnerable to group coercion: Individuals whose 
identity is psychologically embedded in a group 
culture often feel group pressure to behave in ways 
they otherwise wouldn’t, to avoid the existential 
crisis of expulsion. When government interven-
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tion in group matters would enhance individual 
autonomy, as in the enforcement of antidiscrimi-
nation laws against racist or sexist group norms, 
group rights that block such intervention subvert 
individual autonomy. Finally, while groups are 
important sources of social values, group values 
are often not those endorsed by political majori-
ties, and may actually undermine majoritarian val-
ues. Gender equality, for example, is both enforced 
by contemporary liberal democracies and rejected 
by much of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism.
Religious groups present an especially intense 
instance of the general paradox of groups. Reli-
gious groups supply complex explanations and 
thick narratives of the meaning of human life, and 
in the name of “religious freedom” often claim spe-
cial exemption from laws that bind everyone else. 
Religious groups are thus an especially important 
source of the personal identities of their believ-
ers who, in turn, are thus especially vulnerable to 
the unregulated pressure and oppression by the 
religious group. These connections to individual 
autonomy and vulnerability are heightened when 
the member is employed by the religious group, 
which adds economic dependence into the mix of 
vulnerabilities.
It bears emphasis that the religious character of 
a group does not immunize it from antisocial 
behavior—current and past events bear witness 
that religions do bad things. Religious groups can 
be racist, they can be sexist, and they can be cruel, 
bureaucratic, and vindictive. Stereotypical think-
ing assumes that churches engage in bad behav-
ior at lower rates than secular groups, but recent 
events suggest otherwise. Instances of clergy abuse 
and sex discrimination, for example, seem as com-
mon in churches as in society generally, if not 
more so.
II. Analytic Touchstones
The paradoxical quality of groups in liberal 
democracy makes it challenging to construct a 
doctrine of religious group freedom, and liberal 
theory consequently lacks well developed doc-
trines of religious group rights. Let me suggest four 
touchstones for thinking about the content of such 
a doctrine: Whether the religious group has an 
ontological status independent of that of its mem-
bers, the extent to which it externalizes the costs of 
membership, the viability of exit from the group, 
and whether the group right is conceptualized as a 
classic “right” or instead as an “immunity.”27
a. Status
Are religious group rights independent or deriva-
tive of individual rights? Put another way, is pro-
tection of religious group autonomy an end in 
itself, or is the rationale for protecting religious 
groups rooted in their protection of their individ-
ual members? As Professor Zucca suggested in this 
workshop, the U.S. tradition has been hostile to a 
group status independent of the rights and mem-
bers of individual group members,28 though as I 
explain below, this may be changing. The answer 
to this question determines whether a religious 
group right properly protects the group regard-
less of how it treats its members, or whether group 
protection is called for only when such protection 
would also shelter individual group members.
Religious groups tend to react to external threats 
and internal dissent like all organizations, by plac-
ing the survival and well-being of the group above 
the best interests of any individual member or of 
27. See generally Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale 
L.J. 16 (1913).
28. Lorenzo Zucca, When Law Met Religion—Three Puzzles 
of Religious Freedom in Secular States.
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members generally. The sex-abuse scandals, again, 
vividly illustrate this. If a group’s rights are merely 
the derivative aggregate of rights held by their mem-
bers, it would be difficult to justify rights that pro-
tect the group at the expense of its members. Only if 
the group has a doctrinal status independent of that 
of its members is such a result justifiable.
b. External Costs
What costs do religious group rights impose on 
persons who do not belong to the group? This is 
the problem of negative externalities, which arises 
when the full costs of some particular behavior are 
not borne by the actor, but instead are “external-
ized” onto others who do not receive its compen-
sating benefits. The classic example of an external-
ized cost is air and water pollution generated by 
a manufacturing plant: The plant and its owners 
benefits from the increased profits from not having 
to bear the expense of environmental safeguards, 
but the costs of the pollution are born by all those 
who use the water and air, and not just by the own-
ers who receive the plant’s increased profits.
It is axiomatic that religious groups cannot be per-
mitted to act in ways that impose the costs of con-
formity to religious group norms on those who 
do not belong to the religious group. Religions 
are free, for example, to discriminate on the basis 
of race or sex in choosing their leaders. Members 
impliedly consent to such discriminatory norms, 
but nonmembers have not, and cannot be forced 
to bear their costs.
c. Exit
How easy is it to leave the religious group? Since 
a theory of implied consent derived from volun-
tary religious group membership underwrites the 
power of the group to impose its norms on mem-
bers, it is appropriate that groups enforce religious 
conformity on their members only so long as the 
members are free to leave the group. This is both a 
legal and a social or cultural question. Even when 
no legal barriers exist to a member’s exit from the 
group, other factors may raise barriers to exit. For 
example, when a family with children belongs 
to the group, one spouse may feel that he or she 
cannot leave the group if doing so would restrict 
access to children or substantially impair parent-
child relations. Similarly, when the group sup-
plies a major component of member identity, as 
is the case with many religious groups, members 
may find it psychologically impossible to leave, for 
abandoning the group is tantamount to abandon-
ing one’s identity. Financially dependent members 
lacking employment and education risk poverty 
and homelessness if they leave the group.
d. Conceptualization
Is the religious group right part of a classic right-
duty relation, or is it rather an immunity corre-
lated to a disability on the government’s power to 
act with respect to certain subject-matters? Reli-
gious group rights are most defensible when (i) the 
group is conceptualized as having an ontological 
status independent of that of its members, thereby 
justifying group autonomy even when it conflicts 
Table 1: this table summarizes various possible combinations showing the protean nature of freedom of religion
Strenght/Scope Individual Collective
High Strenght Conscience (e.g. USA) Group R (ECHR para. 1)
Low Strenght Thought (France DRMC) Group R with limitations (ECHR para. 2)
Inclusive Democracy in Europe18
with the well-being of group members; (ii) recog-
nition of a religious group right does not exter-
nalize the costs of membership on nonmembers 
or on society as a whole; and (iii) it is legally and 
otherwise viable for members to leave the group. 
Even when a religious group right is prima facie 
cognizable, however, the effect of the right when it 
is deployed depends on whether it is conceptual-
ized as a classic “right” or instead as an immunity.
Commentators sympathetic to religious group 
autonomy are fond of describing religious group 
rights in terms of “jurisdiction” and even “sover-
eignty,” as if religious groups were separate coun-
tries whose sovereign status immunizes them 
from laws and actions of the country wherein they 
and their members reside. This is, at best, an exag-
geration. No private group residing in a liberal 
democracy enjoys sovereign immunity from the 
actions of government, even for its internal affairs. 
Given a sufficiently important reason, government 
can and does intervene in “internal” religious 
group matters as, yet again, the child abuse scan-
dals demonstrate. Theories of how and when the 
government may intervene, however, vary consid-
erably, depending on whether they conceptualize 
religious group rights as “rights” which the gov-
ernment is duty-bound to observe in exercising its 
legitimate powers, or instead as “immunities” cor-
related with structural disabilities that withhold 
sovereign power from government and preclude if 
from acting in the first place.
There is a lot at stake in the answer to this ques-
tion. Professor Zucca, for example, discusses the 
right to freedom of belief as if it were both a right 
which government has a duty to observe, and an 
immunity with which government is disabled 
from interfering. But these jurisprudential con-
cepts are distinct, and lead to distinct doctrinal 
outcomes.
The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S First Amend-
ment is such a right: It imposes a general duty 
of religious equality on government, requiring 
it to avoid targeting religion overtly or covertly. 
Because a right conditions or limits the exercise 
of power that the government legitimately pos-
sesses and could properly exercise in absence of 
the right, the right-holder may waive the right if 
he or she freely chooses to do so, and protection of 
the right is properly balanced against government 
interests that conflict with such protection. Thus, a 
religious group right may be waived or otherwise 
lost by group action or inaction not consistent 
with assertion of the right, and may also be over-
ridden by an important government interest.
Structural immunities, on the other hand, allo-
cate sovereign power in the first place, granting or 
withholding such power from government, for the 
benefit of society as a whole. When a constitution 
affirmatively denies sovereign power to the gov-
ernment, the government is absolutely disabled 
from exercising the power so denied. So structural 
immunities may not be waived, because they are 
imposed for the benefit of the whole society, and 
not just for those whose personal liberty might 
be threatened in a particular instance. Nor does it 
matter that the government has an important or 
even “compelling” reason for exercising the power: 
There is no justification sufficient to invest the 
government with sovereign power that its con-
stituting document withholds from it. The U.S. 
Establishment Clause is such a structural disabil-
ity: Federal and state governments are absolutely 
prohibited from establishing religion, regardless 
of the importance of the government’s reasons for 
doing so, and even if no one objects. Government 
action which exceeds the structural limits marked 
by the Establishment Clause is not, and cannot 
ever be, constitutionally legitimate.
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When religious group rights are conceptualized as 
structural disabilities, the focus is necessarily on 
the breadth or subject-matter of the disability—
that is, the field of action the government is barred 
from entering by the disability. For example, the 
Establishment Clause disables government from 
making theological decisions on behalf of a church, 
as when, for example, courts are called upon to 
allocate church property between two factions in 
the membership by awarding the property to the 
faction that has most faithfully adhered to church 
doctrine. But courts remain free to decide such 
factional disputes on nontheological grounds—
“neutral principles of secular law”—by looking at 
deeds, trust, and other secular evidence of prop-
erty ownership. Government is free to intervene in 
internal religious group affairs, in other words, so 
long as the intervention falls outside the bounds of 
the subject-matter definition which sets the limits 
of the Establishment Clause disability.
When a religious group right is conceptualized as a 
“right,” the analytic focus is on the group’s actions—
did it expressly forego the protections of the right, 
or act in a manner that would be inconsistent with 
an intention to claim such protections?—and the 
government’s interests in regulating the religious 
group—are these sufficiently weighty to justify 
setting the right aside in the particular circum-
stance? Such considerations are irrelevant, how-
ever, if the religious group right is conceptualized 
as an immunity—that is, as a structural disability 
on government’s power to act; there the focus is on 
the definition of the subject-matter as to which the 
government is disabled from acting—is the gov-
ernment action within or without the bounds of 
the disability?
III. An Example: The U.S. 
Contraception-Coverage 
Mandate
The current controversy in the United States 
over mandated contraception coverage by health 
insurance plans provides a useful example of how 
these doctrinal religious group-rights touchstones 
might function in actual application. Many reli-
gious groups have asserted a group free exercise 
right not to comply with the so-called “contra-
ception mandate” of the U.S. Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”), President 
Obama’s signature legislative accomplishment 
during his first term. The ACA seeks to expand 
health-insurance coverage and covered health-
care services in the United States. Accordingly, the 
ACA mandates that all “preventive healthcare ser-
vices” be covered by private health insurance plans 
without additional co-payments, co-insurance, 
deductibles, or other cost beyond the monthly 
insurance premium. However, the regulations pro-
mulgated by the Obama administration define all 
FDA-approved methods of contraception (includ-
ing “emergency contraception” like the “morn-
ing-after” and “week-after” pills and intrauterine 
devices, which avoid pregnancy by preventing a 
fertilized egg from implanting in the womb) as 
“preventive healthcare services”—hence the term, 
“contraception mandate.” Churches and their 
“integrated auxiliaries” are exempt from comply-
ing with the mandate, but most religious hospitals, 
colleges, charities, and other religious nonprofits 
are subject to it, as are all for-profit businesses.
A number of religious nonprofits and for-profit 
businesses have challenged the mandate as a vio-
lation of their group right to freely exercise anti-
contraception religious beliefs. Many of these 
plaintiffs are affiliated with the Roman Catholic 
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church, whose teachings prohibiting use of “arti-
ficial” contraception have been rejected by most 
American Catholics; others are conservative Protes-
tants who conscientiously object to emergency con-
traception as equivalent to abortion. All of the plain-
tiffs employ and/or serve large numbers of persons 
who do not share their anti-contraception beliefs.
How should one think about a group free exer-
cise right in this context? One can begin with an 
examination of religious group status, external-
ized costs, possibilities of exit, and how the right 
might be conceptualized.
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sions in Citizens United and Hosanna-Tabor,29 
there is a powerful argument that religious and 
certain other groups have an ontological status in 
U.S. constitutional law that is wholly independent 
of the individual interests of their members. Thus, 
the fact that the interests and beliefs of employees 
and other members of the plaintiff groups diverge 
from those of the group itself is not highly rele-
vant—although it is at the least ironic that the vast 
majority of Roman Catholics in the United States 
have rejected their church’s anti-contraception 
teachings. If the plaintiff groups hold a free exer-
cise right, the group’s status as a right-holder is 
organic rather than derivative of the right-holding 
status of its members.
Externalized costs and possibilities for exit, how-
ever, cut the other way. Exempting the plain-
tiff groups from the mandate would allow those 
groups to impose the costs of their anti-contra-
29. Hosanna-Tabor Ch. & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 
(2012) (recognizing unconditional right of religious 
group to terminate schoolteacher in ministerial call-
ing); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (rec-
ognizing corporation as person whose speech rights 
were unconstitutionally infringed by campaign finance 
regulation).
ception beliefs on employees who do not share 
them, many of whom do not even belong to 
the group’s affiliated religion. Such employees 
would be denied the statutory benefits of no-
cost contraception to which they are otherwise 
entitled under the ACA. Employees who desire 
these benefits may quit their jobs, but the practi-
cal obstacles are high: They may be required to 
take a cut in salary or to relocate, they may forfeit 
unvested employee benefits available at the plain-
tiff group, and in a weak economy they may not 
find alternative employment at all. Here one sees 
an illustration of Professor Zucca’s insight that 
conscience exemptions can sometimes function 
offensively, as a sword against society, and not as 
a mere defense to government action.30
On balance, the two of the first three doctrinal 
touchstones weigh against recognition of a group 
right. But even if a group right of exemption from 
the mandate were recognized, its strength and 
reach would depend on whether it is a right or 
instead an immunity from government action. If 
a group right, an exemption from the mandate 
might still be expressly or impliedly waived—
say, by a religious group’s voluntary entrance into 
employment and service markets governed by 
public values that condemn the imposition of one’s 
religious beliefs on others. The exemption would 
also be liable to override by a compelling govern-
ment interest—say, the need to equalize currently 
gender-disparate healthcare costs borne by men 
and women, or the need to improve gender equity 
in the workplace by affording women greater con-
trol over child-bearing. On the other hand, if the 
right is conceptualized as an immunity correlated 
with a structural disability preventing govern-
ment from burdening religious group practices, as 
much pro-religion jurisdiction/sovereignty rheto-
30. Zucca, op.cit.
Inclusive Democracy in Europe21
ric implies, then the group right is absolute, with 
neither waiver nor balancing available to mitigate 
its effects on employees who do not share their 
employer’s anti-contraception beliefs.
*   *   *
Religious group rights seem normatively attrac-
tive, but they do not come without sobering costs 
to individual liberty, which ought to be carefully 
weighed against benefits before such rights are 
irretrievably embedded in Western jurisprudence.
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3
New Challenges 
To Religious 
Freedom In 
Europe
by HEGUMEN PHILIP RYABYKH31¨
Introduction
The understanding and the interpretation of reli-
gious freedom today depends on the role that 
religion plays in society. To my mind, at least, 
three factors make religion important from this 
perspective: first, the “new visibility” of religions 
in the public sphere; second, the normative posi-
tions of religions on issues of social life; and third, 
the various ways in which religions try to achieve 
these positions, especially extremist forms. In this 
paper, I will make five points in order to substanti-
ate this claim. 
31. Dr. of theology, Dr. of political sciences, representa-
tive of Russian Orthodox Church in Strasbourg to the 
Council of Europe
I. New visibility of 
religions
The thesis of the growing religious presence in 
societies is contested from time to time. Discus-
sions take place about the exact numbers of the 
faithful, the “quality” of their faith or their links 
with religious institutions. It is also obvious that 
the religious landscape, or more generally the 
“worldview landscape”, in each country is dynamic. 
The principle of religious freedom is called upon 
in a democratic society to regulate the relations 
between different religions and beliefs in a chang-
ing situation.
However, we are aware of examples of times when 
religious groups have strived to radically change 
the religious situation in a country. Religious 
freedom has sometimes been misused by various 
governments or non-governmental forces as an 
instrument to promote “their” religions in other 
countries. For example, on April 15 2012, Mus-
lim Salafists distributed one million copies of the 
Koran on the streets of Germany and planned to 
distribute 25 million more in Austria and Switzer-
land. Some Western Christian organizations act 
in the same manner in Muslim countries. Such 
actions are motivated by the understanding that 
relations between religions function as a market of 
supply and demand. But such an approach leads to 
the establishment of the right of the stronger, and 
may result in conflicts and instability in society. 
From my point of view, religious freedom must 
not be misused to protect missionary strategies 
that aim to achieve radical change in the religious 
landscape of a country. The just approach to the 
protection of religious freedom cannot accept the 
ambitions of different religious or non-religious 
groups which try to expand within a society at the 
expense of other groups, or indeed human rights.
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II. Balanced protection of 
religious minorities and 
majorities
It is also unjust when international religious free-
dom advocacy refers to religious freedom only in 
the sense of the protection of religious minorities. 
Religious freedom does not exist in the abstract 
and pure form. It is always embodied in a par-
ticular individual way. In Europe, Christianity has 
historically represented the main religious belief. 
People’s choices in favor of traditional Christi-
anity as already rooted in Europe should also be 
protected by religious freedom, and not just the 
freedom of religions which have appeared rela-
tively recently. That is why the Russian Church 
calls for the preservation and development of a 
worthy Christian presence in the private and pub-
lic spheres of European countries. This concerns 
not only religious symbols, but also the presence 
of Christian content in education and training, 
media, culture and social projects. 
This explains why the Russian Orthodox Church 
has expressed disagreement with the decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights in 2009 on 
the removal of crucifixes from classrooms in Italy 
(the Lautsi-case)32 and why Russia supported Italy 
in its appeal to the Grand Chamber of the Stras-
bourg Court. One cannot but express satisfaction 
at the fact that the Court changed its decision. Now 
the Court is considering two new cases, this time 
from the United Kingdom (Shirley Chaplin and 
Nady Eveyda)33, which are very closely related to 
the Italian case. These two women were forbidden 
from wearing a baptismal cross in the workplace. 
32. Lautsi v. Italy, ECtHR 3/11/2009 (30814/06) and 
18/03/2011 (Grand Chamber)
33. Eweida and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 
15/01/2013 (48420/10; 59842/10; 51671/10; and 
36516/10)
The protection of the rights of Christians in 
Europe or of Muslims in Asia must not mean 
discrimination against other religions or secular 
philosophical beliefs, especially if they have been 
present in these countries for a long time. Today 
there are instances of severe violence and crime 
against Christians in some Muslim countries. We 
also see examples of injustice and offenses against 
Muslims in Europe and in the United States of 
America.
Of course, increasing diversity requires a special 
effort to maintain a just balance and mutual respect 
between different communities in manifesting 
their religions. In each case, it requires great effort 
to fairly distribute public space between religions, 
and to create a new balance between religious and 
secular symbols, holidays and clothes. This is pos-
sible only when every religious community volun-
tarily accepts the level of public and government 
attention which corresponds to its size and impact 
on society and the rights of others. 
In modern dynamic societies, it is just not only 
to protect religious minorities at some selective 
choice but to consider the complexity of different 
(historical and cultural) factors and build a bal-
anced system of protection of rights for religious 
majorities and minorities.
III. Religious freedom and 
morality
Modern society is becoming more and more plu-
ralistic in its approaches to anthropology and, as 
a result, to morality too. If in the past ‘pluralism’ 
referred to different visions of changes in societies 
on the same anthropological basis, pluralism today 
concerns the understanding of the very nature of 
what the human being actually is: what life and 
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death are (the questions of euthanasia and abor-
tion); what family is (the questions of surrogate 
motherhood, artificial insemination and adoption 
of children by same-sex couples); what gender is 
(the interpretation of trans-sexuality). All these 
notions are dealt with in religious teachings.
For religions, the adoption of general norms 
which contradict religious views in a society is a 
real challenge. Sometimes there are serious clashes 
between different values or their interpretations. 
Unfortunately, today’s international and national 
institutions tend to accept a vision of ‘what a per-
son is’ based on attitudes and perceptions sup-
ported by only one section of society. Intentionally 
or not, this leads to discrimination against sup-
porters of other approaches, including religious 
ones. This trend is particularly evident in respect 
of questions relating to gender and family rela-
tions, and could lead to a breach of peace in soci-
ety and to societal destabilization.
As to the Russian Orthodox Church, it adopted a 
set of documents concerning social life and anthro-
pology – The Basis of Social Conception (2000), the 
Document on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights 
(2008) and others.34 In these documents, the Rus-
sian Church’s point of view has been expressed 
clearly: “The Christian law is fundamentally supra-
social. It cannot be part of the civil law, though in 
Christian societies it can make a favorable influ-
ence on it as its moral foundation”. This does not 
refer to the conquest of secular space, because the 
document continues: “any attempt to develop civil, 
criminal and public law based on the Gospel alone 
34. Russian Orthodox Church. The Bases of the Social 
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. Moscow, 
2000. http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/social-
concepts/; Russian Orthodox Church. “The Russian 
Orthodox’s Church Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, 
Freedom and Rights.” Moscow, 2008). http://www.mos-
pat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/.
cannot be efficient, for without the full churching 
of life, that is without complete victory over sin, 
the law of the Church cannot become the law of 
the world. This victory is possible, however, only in 
the eschatological perspective” (5.IV).
Today religions try to preserve their freedom 
not only in an exclusive way, claiming for them-
selves the right that some norms may not apply 
to religious communities, but they also insist on 
their right to contribute to the shaping of the gen-
eral norms that apply to the whole of society. It 
is real challenge for international religious free-
dom advocacy to create a mechanism that satis-
fies the legal expectations of religious people and 
to protect their anthropological views stemming 
directly from their religious convictions. This does 
not mean that the principle of the secular state is 
rejected as such. The presence of religious argu-
ments in public debates does not mean that legal 
texts should make reference to sacred texts. But 
religious views and a religious agenda can legally 
be a part of society through democratic proce-
dures and can be freely supported by citizens. This 
principle is reflected in Article 9 of the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms: “freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion or belief”. So religion can 
legally participate in society life, with its agenda, 
through the democratic procedures.
I should stress that this right to practice religion is 
a personal right, but one which can also be realized 
through collective forms, such as that of a religious 
community. On the basis of individual religious 
choice, a person can arrange his or her entire life, 
including professional and social aspects, and give 
voice to his or her convictions through democratic 
procedures. A religious world-view should again 
be recognized as a source of social principles and 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe25
political norms for individuals and for groups of 
people. This is what could be called a new or “post-
secular” understanding of secularism.
IV. Need for a new 
interpretation of “secular 
state”
Today, we are also aware of claims that the inter-
nal rules of a religious community should be in 
accordance with the general democratic order. 
However, let me recall again Article 9: “Freedom 
to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be sub-
ject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others”. What 
happens when morals change in a society and 
become increasingly pluralistic? How should reli-
gious freedom, which also extends to freedom of 
religious teaching and self-organization, be pro-
tected in this case? Christian churches usually rely 
on canon law to define their internal life. In the 
Social Conception of the Russian Church, we read: 
“In the Church founded by the Lord Jesus, there 
is special law based on the Divine Revelation. It is 
the canon law” (IV. 5).
There are a number of cases before the European 
Court of Human Rights concerning relations 
between the internal regulations of church com-
munities and secular legislation. On January 31 
2012, for example, the court ruled in the case of 
the “Good Shepherd” union against Romania.35 In 
this decision, the court took the side of a group 
of people who wanted to create a trade union of 
clergy, on the basis of civil law, within the Roma-
35. Sindicatul Păstorul cel Bun cv. Romania, ECtHR, 
31/01/2012, (2330/99).
nian Orthodox Church in order to engage in dia-
logue with Church leadership. This idea, which 
was supported by the Court, strongly contradicts 
canon law. Another decision, which violated the 
internal regulations of the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Church, was adopted by the European Court of 
Human Rights in 2008 in the case of “Metropoli-
tan Innocent against Bulgaria”36. In our view, in 
such cases the Court should seek to respect inter-
nal rules and regulations and should refrain from 
interfering in religious affairs.
There is also a risk of substituting spiritual and 
moral values with social principles. At an annual 
meeting of the Committee of Ministers dedi-
cated to the religious dimension of intercultural 
dialogue, which took place in Luxembourg in 
2011, a member of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe said that the values of 
the Council of Europe should be higher than reli-
gious values. Indeed, sometimes political authori-
ties seek to define values of the spiritual and moral 
order which are beyond their competence. To 
my mind, the legal system should not make deci-
sions on spiritual or moral issues, such as paternal 
behavior or human sexual behavior. Spiritual and 
moral standards must exist freely in society, as the 
source for legislation. 
The preamble to the Statute of the Council of 
Europe in 1949 reads: “stating its commitment to 
the spiritual and moral values, which are the com-
mon heritage of their peoples and the true source 
of individual freedom, political liberty and the 
rule of law, principles which form the basis of all 
genuine democracy”. Thus in the preamble, the dif-
ferent spheres (“spiritual and moral values” and 
“principles of liberty”; “rule of law” and “democ-
36. Case of Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church 
(Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others v. Bulgaria, 
ECtHR, 16/9/2010, (412/03; 35677/04)
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racy”) were distinguished. Religious communities 
exist within the first sphere, and the second sphere 
is more characteristic of states and intergovern-
mental organizations. But there is no mention in 
the preamble to the Statute of a barrier existing 
between the spheres; on the contrary, the docu-
ment emphasizes the connection between the two 
spheres, calling the spiritual and moral values “the 
common heritage” and “the true source”.
So there is a need for a new interpretation of the 
notion of a “secular state”, in order to eliminate 
discrimination against religious communities in 
the shaping of norms in societies. The principle of 
secularity applies only to functions and forms of 
state activities and not to all areas of societal life. 
Good practice of religious freedom occurs when 
the state ensures the freedom to join or to leave 
a religious group and does not intervene in the 
internal affairs of religious organizations.
V. Raising hostility against 
religious communities and 
believers
Dialogue and interaction between different reli-
gions and worldviews are very important aspects 
of religious freedom. In a multicultural society, 
it is necessary to maintain respectful standards 
of dialogue and discussion, especially in light of 
the rapid developments in electronic communica-
tion and the need to protect freedom of speech. 
The report of the Eminent Persons Group of the 
Council of Europe, “Living together - diversity and 
freedom in Europe of the XXI century”37, which 
was prepared in 2011, was designated to work out 
37. Living together. Combining diversity and freedom in 
21st-century Europe, Report of the Group of Eminent 
Persons of the Council of Europe. Brussels, 2011.
mechanisms to balance religious freedom and 
freedom of expression and assembly. 
The report is a call to refrain from distortion and 
inaccurate statements concerning religious beliefs, 
including ridicule or disparagement of religions, 
their founders, or sacred symbols. However, this 
call is followed by the remark: “It is not the prov-
ince of the law or the public authorities to enforce 
such consideration”.38 Now, in our view, it is obvi-
ous that a multicultural society cannot accept spe-
cial laws on blasphemy, but insults to the religious 
feelings of citizens and slander against the activities 
of the religious associations to which they belong 
should be stopped by law in order to protect the 
dignity and rights of religious citizens and to pre-
vent the exhibitions of hatred in speeches against 
them. This position is expressed in the document 
“The attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to 
publicly deliberate blasphemy and slander against 
the Church”, which was adopted in 2011.39 In this 
context, it seems important to note that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, in practice, does not 
accept that for example ethnic minorities should 
have special rights, but accepts the right to preserve 
ethnic identity as an element of human dignity. It 
seems that the same approach could be applied to 
freedom of expression and religious freedom.
Over the last few years in Europe, we have often 
witnessed public regular performances and other 
actions which have targeted religious communi-
ties with various forms of aggressive, humiliating 
and offensive behavior. Such events have taken 
place time and again in France, Italy, Spain, Nor-
38. Ibid., p. 36.
39. Russian Orthodox Church, The attitude of the Russian 
Orthodox Church to publicly deliberate blasphemy 
and slander against the Church, Moscow, 2011: http://
mospat.ru/en/documents/otnoshenie-russkojj-pra-
voslavnojj-cerkvi-k-namerennomu-publichnomu-
bogokhulstvu-i-klevete-v-adres-cerkvi/
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way, Russia and other countries. The point is not 
the existence of mass media, or organizations or 
institutions which are anti-religious, or critical 
of religious organizations or religious teachings. 
This kind of realization of freedom of conscience 
has long been present in Europe. There is a new 
wave of what we consider to be an invasion into 
precisely the private space of believers which 
should be protected by laws on freedom of con-
science. The objects of this violation include reli-
gious symbols installed in public places, buildings 
of worship, religious cemeteries and holy places. 
For many religious citizens in European countries, 
religious life is integral to their individual dignity. 
When the private space of believers is violated by 
someone in order to impose a political position or 
commit actions which insult or humiliate believ-
ers’ dignity, it is no longer freedom of speech or 
self-expression. It is an elementary violation of the 
rights of believers.
In relation to the methods used by religious orga-
nizations to promote their positions in society, 
there can also be very different forms: from spiri-
tual practices, argumentation and social work to 
extremism and terrorism. According to the Rus-
sian Church’s Social Doctrine, the most radical civil 
method permitted is that of “disobedience” in case 
of “an indisputable violation committed by society 
or state against the statutes and commandments 
of God” (IV.9). It is beyond the Church’s duties to 
prepare revolutions or to take over political power.
In these new circumstances, religious freedom 
remains a very important value, but at the same 
time is very fragile; this is why it needs to be pro-
tected in the consideration of new challenges.
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Rethinking 
religious 
freedom
by ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD40
I. The ‘first freedom’41
Like a good movie, the story of international reli-
gious freedom offers something for everyone. It 
is a battle between cowardly oppressors and the 
undaunted and heroic saviors of the downtrod-
den.42 It is a story of the triumph of international 
law and the policing of those who fail to adhere 
to global norms and standards.43 It is a story of 
the secular tolerance of plural beliefs as a remedy 
for religious beliefs that would otherwise lead to 
40. Associate Professor Department of Political Science, 
Northwestern University. Co-organizer: “Politics of 
Religious Freedom: Contested Norms and Local Prac-
tices”, eshurd@northwestern.edu
41. This working paper draws on my book manuscript The 
Secular Establishment: Religion, Law and Authority in 
International Politics (in progress), and on E.S. Hurd, 
‘Believing in religious freedom,’ The Immanent Frame 
(March 1, 2012). http://bit.ly/wqmRWT. That post is 
part a series, guest edited by Winnifred Fallers Sulli-
van and myself, in conjunction with a joint research 
project on religious freedom. The series (http://blogs.
ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-religious-freedom/) consid-
ers the multiple histories and genealogies of religious 
freedom—and the multiple contexts in which those 
histories and genealogies are salient today.
42. See http://www.opendoorsusa.org
43. See http://www.uscirf.gov
violence.44 And today especially, it is a story of the 
need for the U.S. government and others to “con-
vince” people in other countries—and particu-
larly Muslims—that they should endorse a model, 
the model, of religious liberty as a template for 
organizing and democratizing their politics and 
societies.45 It is also a story of human progress 
and emancipation, of transforming conditions of 
religious oppression to liberate individuals—par-
ticularly women—from their primitive, discrimi-
natory ways. Working alone and in tandem, these 
narratives justify intervention to save, shape, and 
sanctify individual and collective lives.
A rapidly escalating number of actors are promot-
ing religious freedom across state borders. There 
is great excitement about the potential of formal-
izing and bureaucratizing religious freedom. Legal 
guarantees of religious freedom are embedded as 
riders in trade agreements, in aid packages, and 
in humanitarian projects around the world. The 
European Union (EU) is promoting religious free-
dom in its external affairs programming, adding 
clauses to trade agreements with North African 
and Central Asian trading partners that guaran-
tee a commitment to religious freedom. In Brus-
sels, initiatives to train EU diplomats in religious 
freedom promotion are in the works, and the EU 
is drafting official guidelines the subject. At the 
UN, the Human Rights office (OHCHR) is in its 
third decade of promoting religious freedom, and 
recently initiated a campaign to combat incite-
ment to religious hatred. 
 State foreign policy establishments are also pro-
moting religious freedom. The most recent exam-
ple is Canada, where Prime Minister Harper 
announced in Spring 2011 that his government 
44. See http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundation.org
45. See Thomas F. Farr, “Religious Freedom Abroad,” First 
Things (March 2012): 21-23.
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intends to create an Office of Religious Freedom 
at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade (DFAIT), modeled on the American 
office in the State Department that has been pro-
moting religious freedom abroad for 14 years. In 
the US religious freedom is described as the “first 
freedom,” a fundamental human right, and a sine 
qua non of modern democratic politics, if not of 
civilization itself. Americans, we are told, invented 
and perfected religious freedom. Americans are so 
devoted to religious freedom that we have become 
official evangelists on its behalf. The International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998 established a State 
Department Office of International Religious 
Freedom, which prepares an annual report on the 
status of religious freedom in every country in the 
world except the US, along with a bipartisan over-
sight committee called the Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom. A recent tweet from 
Hillary Clinton—a real one, not the spoof “texts 
from Hillary”-described religious freedom as “a 
bedrock priority of our foreign policy.”
The promotion of religious freedom is ubiqui-
tous. And it is not only evangelicals. An impressive 
array of institutions and public authorities across 
the political spectrum, both secular and religious, 
has taken up the cause. Like human rights, reli-
gious freedom stands in for the good and the right 
in many difficult and often violent situations. In all 
of the excitement surrounding religious freedom 
as a universal norm—who can be against religious 
freedom?—it is easy to forget that these are politi-
cal projects, situated in history, and implemented 
by powerful state and international authorities. It 
is easy to be swept up in the common sense that 
guaranteeing religious freedom is what keeps at 
bay pre-modern political orders based on tyranni-
cal forms of religious authority that leave women 
and minorities in the dust. When religious free-
dom is positioned as the antidote to such unap-
pealing options, it is not surprising that it has 
gathered so much momentum. 
As the European Union and others stand poised 
to join the religious freedom bandwagon, however, 
there is a need to step back from the excitement 
and the anxiety surrounding the international 
promotion of religious freedom. The promotion of 
religious freedom is not simply about the spread 
of a beneficent universal norm and legal standard. 
It is a site of politics, and it is a site of religious 
politics. This paper will argue that religious free-
dom advocacy—and religious freedom as a dis-
cursive frame that is used to orient action in the 
world—actively politicizes religious difference, 
masks complex political realities on the ground, 
and obscures mixed and multiform religious reali-
ties as they are lived and experienced. The legal-
ization and top-down promotion of religious 
freedom helps to create a world in which official 
religious difference becomes more salient politi-
cally, not less. It draws lines between communities, 
horizontally and hierarchically. It helps to define 
what it means to be religious, and to be free. 
The promotion of religious freedom shapes and 
constrains political realities, and religious pos-
sibilities, on the ground. It obscures local ways 
of living with religious difference. This leads to a 
question: what would it look like to be skeptical 
of the promise of religious freedom, while also 
strongly opposing all forms of religious persecu-
tion and other forms of injustice and domination?
But why even be skeptical? How can anyone 
object to official promotion of religious freedom 
when religious minorities suffer so much official 
persecution? In Maspero last October, the Egyp-
tian military establishment attacked peaceful 
protesters demanding rights for Coptic Christian 
citizens. At least 25 were killed and 300 injured. 
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Deplorable oppression and murder are suffered by 
the Rohingya, a Muslim people living in the state 
of Rakhine in western Myanmar, who are denied 
rights or legal representation by their government. 
Governments in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where 
the Arab spring was never allowed to get off the 
ground, repress local Shi’a minorities on a daily 
basis. 
These groups deserve international and local sup-
port, but not in the guise of religious freedom pro-
motion.
When the United States uses its authority to pro-
mote religious freedom, the government is weigh-
ing in on which forms of religion should be legally 
protected. The US sets standards that effectively 
bolster the sects, denominations, and religious 
authorities that it has defined as authentic and 
benevolent, while marginalizing less desirable 
counterparts. This does not solve the complex 
challenges posed by everyday life in religiously 
diverse societies. Rather, in practice, outsider pro-
motion of religious freedom turns religion into 
a matter for law and politics. Instead of calming 
tensions, it hardens lines of division between com-
munities by enforcing the interests of particular 
groups defined in religious terms. The current crisis 
in Syria is an example.
II. Crisis in Syria
Calls for the protection of persecuted Christians 
in Syria and around the Middle East have been a 
cornerstone of US-based religious freedom advo-
cacy in the wake of the uprisings. Joe Eibner of 
Christian Solidarity International has lobbied 
President Obama to urge Ban Ki-moon to declare 
a genocide warning for Christians across the Mid-
dle East. Howard Berman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee says that the future of minori-
ties is “on our agenda as we figure out how to help 
these countries” and their treatment of Christians 
and other minorities is a “‘red line’ that will affect 
future aid.” Habib Malik of Lebanese Ameri-
can University calls for Western nations to stand 
up for the rights of Christians, who he says may 
be cleansed from lands where democratic elec-
tions are used to oppress minorities rather than 
empower them. While this must be done “in a way 
that is not misperceived on the other end,” Malik 
says, “the West should not be cowed.” USA Today 
reports that according to Christian rights groups, 
“Christians in Syria, where Muslims have risen up 
against President Bashar Assad, have been sub-
jected to murder, rape and kidnappings in Damas-
cus and rebellious towns.”46
The momentum builds. The apparent logic of 
the story is clear: when “Muslims rise up against 
Assad,” (in other words, when the Muslim-major-
ity populations of the Middle East are left to their 
own devices and no longer repressed by secular 
autocrats), the result is Christian persecution. But 
the problem is that the Syrian protests are not cap-
tured by the notion of “Muslims rising up against 
Assad.” This is how the regime wants us to see the 
story. For decades, the Assads have relied on the 
threat of sectarian anarchy lurking just below the 
surface to justify their autocratic rule. When reli-
gious freedom advocates, the media, government 
officials and other public figures reinforce the 
regime’s framing of the war as a sectarian con-
flict pitting Sunnis against Alawites and their Shi-
ite allies, it makes sectarian violence more likely. 
It energizes divides between Christian, Alawite 
and Sunni. It brings these identities to the surface, 
accentuates, and aggravates them. When religious 
difference becomes the primary lens through 
46. http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/story/2012-
01-30/arab-spring-christians/52894182/1
Inclusive Democracy in Europe31
which this complex social, economic and political 
conflict is framed, sectarian conflict worsens. Cat-
egories of religious difference (Christian, Alawite, 
Sunni) that might not otherwise necessarily define 
what began as a popular uprising against a secular 
autocracy become newly salient. 
Many Syrians, like people everywhere, hold mul-
tiple allegiances, celebrate diverse traditions, are 
of mixed backgrounds, and do not fit into the 
rubrics of religious identity marketed by religious 
freedom advocates. Left out in the cold, these ‘in-
between’ individuals find themselves in the impos-
sible position of having to make political claims 
on religious grounds, or having no grounds from 
which to speak.47 This situation pressures dissent-
ers, doubters, and families that include multiple 
religious affiliations to choose a side and define 
their identities in religious terms: “are you this or 
are you that?” In emphasizing these differences, 
religious freedom advocacy activates and politi-
cizes religious difference. It also systematically 
ignores the widespread existence of anti-Assad 
Alawites and Syrians who do not identify with a 
single religious tradition.
In Syria, then, religious freedom promotion adds 
fuel to the fire of the very sectarian conflict that 
religious freedom claims to be uniquely equipped 
to transcend. It also masks complex political and 
religious realities on the ground. To suggest that 
the conflict stems from a failure to acknowledge 
the rights of certain believers conceals the ways in 
which social divisions cut across sectarian divides. 
It obscures the ways forward when the focus is 
not on beliefs or communities of believers, but on 
shared human needs and visions. 
47. Elizabeth A. Castelli, “Theologizing Human Rights: 
Christian Activism and the Limits of Religious Free-
dom,” in Michel Feher with Gaëlle Krikorian and Yates 
McKee, eds. Non-Governmental Politics (New York: 
Zone Books, 2007), p. 684.
Of course, the mobilization of the logic of sectari-
anism for political ends extends far beyond Syria, 
and exceeds the language of religious freedom. For 
example, this logic has come to dominate media 
coverage of the uprising in Bahrain, where an 
embattled regime, challenged by both Shi’a and 
Sunni dissenters, has largely succeeded in fram-
ing the conflict as sectarian by mobilizing Sunni 
against Shi’a on the claim that the latter are con-
trolled by a predatory Iran.48 As Joost Hiltermann 
argues, “by whipping up sectarian sentiments, the 
[Bahraini] government hopes to change the per-
ception of the conflict from one that pits a popular 
pro-democracy movement against an authoritar-
ian regime to one of a sectarian struggle between 
Sunni and Shia, with the strong government 
needed to maintain order.”49 Religious freedom 
taps into and feeds this logic, but it does not gen-
erate it by itself. It is part of a broader complex.
My point is that in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere, 
the complex histories, experiences and uncer-
tainties that shape religious identification cannot 
be squeezed into the rigid categories imposed by 
the logic of religious freedom. They just don’t fit. 
Recent scholarship in the study of religion is help-
ful in developing this point. As Noah Salomon and 
Jeremy Walton write:
What makes someone a believer or a mem-
ber of a faith community and what makes 
someone not so? What life experiences, con-
fessional commitments, and ritual practices 
qualify one as an insider, and which prohibit 
an individual from inclusion? Are ‘insider’ 
48. Joost Hiltermann, “Bahrain: A New Sectarian Con-
flict?” The New York Review of Books Blog (May 8, 
2012). Hiltermann observes that, “Sunni-Shia interac-
tion is what defines daily life at the workplace and in 
many neighborhoods.”
49. Ibid.
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and ‘outsider’ categories that we must inhabit 
permanent or can we move creatively between 
them? Most importantly, should scholars [or 
governments?] attempt to adjudicate these 
questions of religious identity and belonging, 
thereby becoming arbiters of orthodoxy?50
Salomon and Walton point to the complexities of 
religious affiliation and practice. They explain the 
difficulties of assigning individuals to the category 
of believer or non-believer. They speak of the 
structures of power—what they call the ‘arbiters of 
orthodoxy’—that are implicated in deciding who 
is officially in, and who’s out. 
The logic of religious freedom, on the other hand, 
does not question the power of established author-
ities to make these designations. It does not inter-
rogate the ability and willingness of individuals to 
live according to them. Instead, these projects fun-
nel people into one community or another, autho-
rizing and relying on boundaries that might not 
otherwise have enjoyed as much political traction. 
Families with multiple religious affiliations under 
the same roof must choose a side when religious 
identity is politicized. For example, the Syrian 
child of a mixed marriage between a Sunni and 
an Alawite is pressured to choose between the two 
identities because officially promoted “religious 
freedom” leaves so little room to be both. Identity 
takes on an exclusivist religious tinge: “are you this 
or are you that?” 
This aggravates sectarian tensions, drawing a line 
under one’s religious identity as the factor that 
trumps others. Being a Christian or a Muslim 
50. Noah Salomon and Jeremy F. Walton, “Religious criti-
cism, secular criticism, and the ‘critical study of reli-
gion’: lessons from the study of Islam,” in Robert A. 
Orsi (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Religious Stud-
ies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 
406.
becomes more important than being pro- or anti-
regime. We saw these dynamics in Bosnia in the 
1990s, when people who described themselves as 
atheists before the war suddenly woke up to find 
themselves identified publically and politically by 
a newly salient religious identity. This also brings 
to mind the old joke about the tourist in Belfast 
who, asked by a local whether he was Catholic or 
Protestant, stated that he was atheist. “But are you 
a Catholic atheist or a Protestant atheist?” queried 
the local.
III. Whose religion? Whose 
freedom?
By promoting official religious identities, the US 
State Department and its kin discount the possibil-
ity of mixed, blurred, indistinct religious identities 
and, in so doing, help perpetuate the very conflicts 
they claim to resolve. In the process, Western gov-
ernments are also deciding what counts as religion 
(as opposed to tradition, culture or superstition, 
for example), and which forms of religion should 
be legally protected. Religion requires protection, 
but superstition does not. 
For instance, the 2010 State Department’s Report 
on the Central African Republic notes that as 
many as 60 percent of the imprisoned women 
in the country had been charged with “witch-
craft,” which the government considers a criminal 
offense—and yet concludes that the government 
“generally respected religious freedom in practice” 
in CAR, and gives the country a good ranking 
overall.51 
This model of religious freedom has no room for 
African Traditional Religions (ATRs, in the jargon) 
like this one. Women imprisoned for witchcraft 
51. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010/148671.htm
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cannot suffer from violations of religious freedom 
because, in Western eyes, they have no religion. 
ATRs fall out of the picture when religious free-
dom comes to town. Practitioners languish in jail 
as a result. 
But the problem runs still deeper. The process of 
legally defining religious freedom also transforms 
religion itself. The urge to locate individuals in 
single faith communities makes religious life hard 
for people who identify with several traditions, 
or perhaps none at all, leading to polarization 
between traditions in the place of hybrid religious 
practice. As Noah Salomon, an expert on Sudan, 
describes the situation there: “to think of such ‘tra-
ditional’ practices as distinct confessions does not 
represent the reality of South Sudanese who may 
identify as Christians and at the same time see 
no contradiction in maintaining these rites and 
rituals.”52 In other words, the religious lives of peo-
ple who practice multiple traditions are rendered 
illegible by the logic of religious freedom, even as 
official religions gain newfound political standing. 
In the new South Sudan, the government’s Bureau 
of Religious Affairs registers “Faith-Based Organi-
zations,” rejecting those Christian organizations 
whose constitutions “do not line up with Biblical 
chapters or verses,” according to an Inspector in 
the Bureau interviewed by Salomon.
And there’s the rub. In these circumstances it is far 
too easy for the religion of the majority, the reli-
gion of those in power, or the particular version 
of a religion supported by the US or other power 
brokers to carry more weight, politically, than oth-
ers. This is occurring in South Sudan, as groups 
that the South Sudanese government disfavors are 
52. Noah Salomon, “Freeing religion at the birth of South 
Sudan,” The Immanent Frame, April 12, 2012 (http://
blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/12/freeing-religion-at-the-
birth-of-south-sudan/).
classified as ‘cults’ while others are registered and 
protected as orthodox.
This suggests a different perspective on official 
US religious freedom promotion efforts, and 
potentially those of the EU as well. Let’s call these 
efforts what they are: political and religious strat-
egies to promote US interests--and, since 9/11 if 
not before, weapons in the ‘war on terror.’ Mod-
eled on US Cold War efforts to combat secularism 
and communism by promoting ‘global spiritual 
health,’ the Office of Religious Freedom is part of 
a US effort to break off moderate Muslims from 
hard-core Islamists overseas. The government 
intervenes in the complex religious landscapes of 
other countries to identify the kind of religion that 
aligns with US interests. That religion is bolstered. 
That religion is freed—or coopted. For instance, 
as The New York Times has reported, in 2005 the 
Pentagon paid the Lincoln Group to “identify reli-
gious leaders who could help produce messages 
that would persuade Sunnis in violence-ridden 
Anbar Province to participate in national elections 
and reject the insurgency.” 53 That’s not religious 
freedom. That’s the U.S. government promoting a 
particular set of policy options in another country, 
using religion as its cloak.
Americans are proud of the concept of religious 
freedom. Questioning the concept makes one 
vulnerable to accusations of defiling something 
sacred. The US office reassures Americans that the 
US is and will remain the leader of a religiously 
free world. It allows Americans to feel morally 
superior to benighted and oppressed foreigners at 
a time of economic uncertainty. It deflects atten-
tion from suffering religious minorities at home, 
such as the victims of the massacre at a Sikh tem-
53. David S. Cloud, & Jeff Gerth, “Muslim Scholars Were 
Paid to Aid U.S. Propaganda,” The New York Times (Jan-
uary 2, 2006).
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ple near Milwaukee in August 2012, and other 
domestic casualties of the ‘war on terror.’54 And 
it fits with a widely held, if rarely discussed, tenet 
among US foreign policy-makers: promoting US 
secular national security interests often requires 
the US to socially engineer religious affairs abroad.
Some will defend this religious interventionism in 
the name of national security and the war on ter-
ror, human rights, or both. This now, apparently, 
includes many Europeans. 
But is this really—and could it ever be—about 
religious freedom? 
Is religious freedom something that can be pro-
moted by powerful arbiters of orthodoxy, whether 
religious or political? If not, then what are all these 
authorities promoting? In whose name do they 
speak? Are those empowered by the spread of reli-
gious freedom capable of assessing and judging the 
lives of those they seek to redeem?55 Is it possible to 
respond to the seemingly unstoppable onslaught 
of religious freedom in the name of alternate ways 
of being religious, and being human, now being 
swept away, ironically, by a single-minded focus 
on religious freedom?
54. The day after the shootings in Wisconsin a mosque 
in Joplin, Missouri was burned to the ground. http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/us/if-the-sikh-temple-
had-been-a-muslim-mosque-on-religion.html?_r=0
55. Lila Abu-Lughod, “Anthropology in the Territory of 
Rights, Islamic, Human, and Otherwise . . .” Proceedings 
of the British Academy 167 (2010), p. 255.
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The Politics 
of Religious 
Freedom: 
Competing Claims 
in the United 
States (and 
Other Places)
by T. JEREMY GUNN56
Introduction
In his most famous work, Walden; Or, Life in the 
Woods, Henry David Thoreau wrote that “I should 
not talk so much about myself if there were any-
body else whom I knew so well.”57 In this Thorea-
vian spirit, I will largely focus on my own experi-
ences with regard to the “politics of religious free-
dom” not because of any importance of myself, 
but because they are the experiences that I know 
best.58 I will secondarily focus on the United States, 
56. Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, Al Akhawayn University
57. Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience 
(New York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2003), 7. 
58. For an earlier treatment of many of the following issues, 
see T. Jeremy Gunn, “The United States and the Promo-
not because it is the most important country in the 
world with regard to the politics of promoting reli-
gious freedom internationally (though I believe 
that it is) nor because it has done the most good 
(which may or may not be the case), but because it 
too is the country I know best. I should also add, 
from the beginning, that I do not attribute any fail-
ings in how the United States handles the intersec-
tion of religion and politics to any peculiar char-
acteristics of the American people, to the makeup 
of their DNA, nor chemicals in American water 
(though there are many), but rather to failings that 
can be found more generally with human beings 
throughout the world who use religion to advance 
political beliefs.
I. The Politics of Religious 
Freedom
Religious freedom, and the politics of religious 
freedom, was largely absent from the international 
agenda prior to the late 1990s. I personally was 
involved with U.S. constitutional law regarding 
religion both academically (the topic of my Ph.D. 
dissertation) and professionally (as an attorney in 
pro bono cases) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
My first encounter with religious freedom as an 
international subject came in the early 1990s when 
I received a query as to whether I might be willing 
to represent the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in a 
case before the European Court of Human Rights. 
Though I had no international human rights expe-
rience, I thought that this was an opportunity I 
should not miss. I began looking for the first time 
into decisions of the European Court and the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and 
tion of Freedom of Religion and Belief,” in Facilitating 
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook Tore Lind-
holm, et al., eds. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004), 721-46.
Inclusive Democracy in Europe36
started my historical inquiry into the situation of 
the Bulgarian church. A few weeks later, when I 
learned that the Church would be interested in 
my representing them only if I could guarantee a 
victory, my enthusiasm dissipated and I guaran-
teed the Church only that I could not guarantee a 
victory. But my interest in the international law of 
religious freedom had been piqued.
My preliminary research forays into international 
freedom of religion or belief in the early 1990s 
were not encouraging. I learned, for example, that 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
did not have any particular interest in religion. 
Amnesty International seemed to report on reli-
gion only incidentally when another issue was 
present, such as when a Catholic priest in Latin 
America had been arrested for opposing govern-
mental corruption. I was, frankly, dismayed to 
learn that the European Court of Human Rights 
had issued no decision interpreting Article 9 of 
the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, 
and every decision of the European Commission 
on Article 9 had held that there was no viola-
tion of the rights of freedom of religion or belief. 
The absence of NGO interest in the issue and the 
absence of action from the United Nations and the 
Council of Europe did not suggest to me that all 
was well in the world, but that the issue was not 
being taken sufficiently seriously. 
In 1993, finally, the European Court issued its first 
Article 9 decision, Kokkinakis v. Greece.59 Although 
Kokkinakis, a Jehovah’s Witness, won his religious 
freedom case overturning his conviction for the 
crime of proselytism, the decision of the European 
Court was based not upon the robust grounds that 
preaching one’s religion to an adult cannot possi-
bly be a crime, but on the rather limited grounds 
that the Greek state prosecutor had failed to prove 
59. Kokkinakis v. Greece, no. 14307/88, ECHR 1993
all of the elements of the “crime of proselytism.” 
In that same year, 1993, the U.N. Committee on 
Human Rights issued its first guidance on inter-
preting Art. 18 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (General Comment 22).60 
It was as if the human rights world was slowly, yet 
haltingly, awakening.
I attended the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights in Vienna and I participated in the small 
NGO session on freedom of religion. It was there 
that I first met several future colleagues – includ-
ing the omnipresent Cole Durham – for the first 
time. Bahia Tahzib was the rapporteur for the ses-
sion and was then working on her doctoral disser-
tation on the United Nations and freedom of reli-
gion or belief (subsequently published in 1996).61 
Johan van der Vyver was there from Emory Uni-
versity and he announced that he and John Witte 
were preparing a conference (ultimately held in 
October 1994) that led to the publication of a two-
volume work in 1996.62 I wrote a chapter for that 
work on the freedom of religion or belief within 
the European human rights system.63 At that that 
time it is was very difficult to obtain decisions of 
the European Commission on Human Rights, and 
I even made a trip to the Council of Europe library 
60. General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18): 07/30/1993. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, General Comment No. 22. 
(General Comments).
61. Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Freedom of Religion or Belief: 
Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
62. See Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 2 vols. 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
63. T. Jeremy Gunn, “Adjudicating Rights of Conscience 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights,” in 
Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr., eds., Reli-
gious Human Rights in Global Perspective (Legal Per-
spectives), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1996), 305-330.
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in Strasbourg so that I could make sure that I 
found them all. (My study was, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first comprehensive review of all 
decisions regarding religion from the Court and 
Commission). I argued that the European Court 
and European Commission had largely failed to 
take religious freedom seriously.
In 1996, the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (OSCE) held in Warsaw, Poland, 
its first seminar (i.e., conference) on the free-
dom of religion or belief entitled “Constitutional, 
Legal and Administrative Aspects of Freedom of 
Religion.”64 The following year the OSCE estab-
lished a Panel of Experts to give ongoing guidance 
on the issue to OSCE participating states. Since 
that time, religion and belief has become a regular 
part of the OSCE activities. The issue of freedom 
of religion or belief was, gradually, becoming a 
part of the international agenda. 
II. The role of the United 
States
Prior to 1996, the United States played only a mod-
est role in the promotion of freedom of religion 
internationally. In 1986, it had been, for example, 
one of the countries to sponsor the creation of the 
position of U.N. Special Rapporteur on religious 
intolerance (now the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Religion or Belief). The United States 
had supported cases of religious freedom involv-
ing the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. 
It had led a movement to “free Soviet Jewry” in the 
1960s and 1970s. Public pressure ultimately con-
tributed to the U.S. Congress enacting the so-called 
“Jackson-Vanik amendment” in 1974, which was 
designed to apply sanctions to the Soviet Union if 
64. Gunn, “Th e United States and the Promotion of Free-
dom of Religion and Belief,” 726. 
it did not open its emigration policies to Jews. The 
United States began publishing annual reports on 
human rights in 1978 that modestly included reli-
gious freedom issues, though the first reports were 
rather sketchy. The first country report on Saudi 
Arabia contained only one sentence: “Islam is the 
established religion of Saudi Arabia and Saudis are 
not permitted to practice other religions, although 
non-Muslim foreigners have been able to hold pri-
vate and discreet religious services.”65
In 1996, during the first Clinton administra-
tion (1993-1997), a collection of conservative 
activists held a conference under the auspices of 
Freedom House entitled “Global Persecution of 
Christians.”66 The conference led to the develop-
ment of a movement that drew attention to the 
persecution of Christians in the world. The follow-
ing year, people associated with this conference 
encouraged the U.S. Congress to enact legislation 
that would require the U.S. government to take 
steps to put pressure on countries that persecute 
Christians. Over time, the proposed legislation 
expanded somewhat beyond the persecution of 
Christians, with the emphasis nevertheless focus-
ing on persecution by Muslim-majority countries 
and communist countries (particularly China). A 
bill entitled the “Freedom from Religious Persecu-
tion Act” (generally known as “Wolf-Specter” fol-
lowing the names of its legislative sponsors) was 
introduced in 1997 that reflected an emphasis 
on imposing sanctions against states that toler-
ated persecution of specified groups (particularly 
65. U.S. Department of State, Report Submitted to the 
Committee on International Relations U.S. House of 
Representatives and Committee on Foreign Relations 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1978), 404.
66. Gunn, “Th e United States and the Promotion of Free-
dom of Religion and Belief,” 727.
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Christians and Tibetan Buddhists).67 This so-
called Wolf-Specter bill did not propose “neutral” 
criteria for identifying persecution against any 
religion, but was focused instead on the nature of 
the regime of the country engaged in persecuting 
(Communist or Muslim-majority) and the groups 
that were particularly subject to abuse (Chris-
tians and Tibetan Buddhists). The bill proposed 
that automatic sanctions be imposed on countries 
once their abuses had been identified.
While the Wolf-Specter bill was slowly working its 
way through the legislative process, an alternate 
bill named the “International Religious Freedom 
Act” was being drafted in the Senate.68 Its focus 
was less on identifying specific countries involved 
in persecution or particular groups suffering from 
persecution, introducing instead relatively neutral 
criteria for identifying both persecuting coun-
tries as well as persecuted groups. It also proposed 
a range of responses that might be taken by the 
U.S. government when it found religious persecu-
tion. The responses proposed by the draft Senate 
bill ranged from issuing a diplomatic demarche 
to imposing economic sanctions. The Senate bill 
ultimately included a provision that created an 
independent agency named the U.S. Commission 
on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). 
After a difficult and often antagonistic legisla-
tive process, the Senate bill was finally adopted, 
unanimously, by both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives as the International Religious 
Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA).69 President Clinton 
immediately signed the bill into law.
67. Ibid., 728-29.
68. Ibid., 729-30.
69. The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 
USC 6401 (Public Law No. 105-292 112 State 2787) 
(subsequently amended).
I worked at the Office of International Religious 
Freedom at the U.S. Department of State during 
the time that IRFA was being negotiated and dur-
ing its first year of implementation. I subsequently 
worked for one year – before resigning in protest 
because of the politicization of issues – as the 
Director of Research at the USCIRF. Although I 
played no role in the legislative process, I was 
involved in the implementation of IRFA both at 
the State Department and at USCIRF.
In my opinion, most of the individuals in the State 
Department and USCIRF who were involved in 
implementing the law and in promoting interna-
tionally the freedom of religion and belief were 
serious, well-meaning, committed, and reasonably 
objective in how they conducted their research 
and how they attempted to implement IRFA. I 
will offer below some counterexamples to illus-
trate some of the problems. In identifying these 
counterexamples I would like to be clear that, in 
my opinion, they were exceptions to the rule, but 
they were important and significant exceptions. 
They reveal, in my opinion, just how easy it was to 
politicize “religious freedom.”
First, in my opinion, one of the important motiva-
tions behind the IRFA legislation and the underly-
ing interest in promoting freedom of religion in 
the late 1990s was the partisan effort by some con-
servative Republicans to undermine politically the 
position of President Clinton. The Wolf-Specter 
and IRFA legislation were being debated at exactly 
the same time that the Republican-dominated 
Congress was investigating President Clinton on 
several issues, including most notably the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal. Many Republicans were search-
ing for issues on which to attack President Clinton 
as he headed toward his campaign for re-election 
in 1996. It was decided that the Clinton adminis-
tration had been less than active in its support for 
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religious freedom abroad. In my personal opin-
ion this was to some extent true – but not at all 
for the reasons that were advanced. Although the 
Clinton administration had not placed a prior-
ity on religious freedom internationally, neither 
had any prior American presidential administra-
tion, from George Washington to George H.W. 
Bush. Indeed, the entire international commu-
nity, as I described above, had not focused on the 
importance of the freedom of religion and belief. 
Under mounting pressure from conservatives 
and Republicans in Congress, the Clinton State 
Department finally began to take the issue more 
seriously during the late 1990s. Thus I believe it 
is fair to say both that the Clinton administration 
had not focused on the issue until it was subjected 
to pressure from conservatives, and, at the same 
time, the issue had never galvanized conservatives 
prior to the mid-1990s when they sought a way 
to attack a president whom they did not like for 
reasons completely unrelated to religious freedom. 
In short, the Clinton administration began to take 
the issue seriously because of right-wing political 
pressure, but the right-wing pressure was a result 
of an “invented” political issue designed to under-
mine a Democratic president.
Second, I witnessed a revealing example of the 
partisan politicization of the process while I 
was at the State Department. The new IRFA law 
required President Clinton to nominate individu-
als to serve as some of the members of the new 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Free-
dom (USCIRF). The President (through the Sec-
retary of State) reasonably promptly identified the 
potential presidential appointments for the Com-
mission. Under standard procedures, the poten-
tial presidential nominees were, prior to a public 
announcement, subjected to the standard clearing 
and vetting process. The process was not swift, but 
it had been launched reasonably quickly by the 
Clinton administration. While it was underway, 
I heard a “conversation” wherein Congressman 
Frank Wolf, a conservative Republican who played 
a significant role in promoting the legislation, 
shouted – I repeat “shouted” – at a State Depart-
ment official condemning the delay in President 
Clinton’s nominating of Commission members. 
He told that official that he should “resign imme-
diately” because Clinton was obviously attempting 
to sabotage the new law by maliciously delaying 
the process. It was not proper at that time for the 
State Department to respond to the irate Con-
gressman about the status of potential nominees. 
Congressman Wolf, in my judgment, was not only 
overreacting, he lost control of himself and made 
partisan and irrational assumptions based upon 
some type of conspiratorial belief that President 
Clinton was opposed to religious freedom. I noted 
with interest that when President George W. Bush, 
a Republican whose political beliefs were closer 
to those of Congressman Wolf, took almost a 
year before naming his Ambassador for Interna-
tional Religious Freedom, that Congressman Wolf 
offered no public condemnation of his fellow-
Republican.
Third, in my opinion, many of the decisions and 
actions of the USCIRF during its first term were 
based on American politics rather than a princi-
pled approach to religious freedom. The partisan 
and ill-informed actions of some Commission 
members led me to believe that the USCIRF was 
doing more harm than good. As a result, I resigned 
my position after its first year. I will give a few 
examples. 
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III. The Politicization of 
Religious Freedom
As the Director of Research at USCIRF, it was one 
of my responsibilities to oversee the preparation of 
the first draft of the USCIRF’s annual report. The 
final draft would be that adopted by the Commis-
sion members themselves. In my draft I included 
references to decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights (whose decisions, in my opinion, 
were slowly improving). I included such references 
in order to support the position that the United 
States was not promoting internationally its own 
particular constitutional understanding of the 
meaning of religious freedom, but was promoting 
an increasingly accepted international standard. 
I believed it would be more effective to suggest 
that what the United States was promoting was 
part of an international consensus rather than the 
peculiar and particular beliefs of Americans. One 
of the Commission members, John Bolton – later 
the George W. Bush administration’s ambassador 
to the United Nations – denounced this particular 
reference in the draft report and demanded that it 
be removed from the Commission’s draft. What I 
had intended as a way of suggesting international 
support was attacked because it was international. 
Bolton said, in words that I remember distinctly, 
“if Jeremy wants to politicize this report then I will 
go to my friends on Capitol Hill and we will have a 
fight about it.” (Although he did not identify who 
his friends were, I assumed that he was referring 
particularly to Senator Jesse Helms.) I had not 
intended to politicize the report or the discus-
sion; Bolton in fact politicized it in no uncertain 
terms. The tame reference to the European Court of 
Human Rights was removed on Bolton’s insistence.
Similar occurrences took place with regard to the 
draft report on Sudan and China. I had intended 
that the draft, which was very critical of the gov-
ernments of Sudan and China, nevertheless 
explain the conflicts in a way that attempted to 
explain the positions of those two governments 
before responding to them. I am of the opinion 
that simple denunciations of other governments 
are not particularly effective – and the goal should 
have been to be persuasive. John Bolton (again) 
and some other Commission members proceeded 
through the draft and slashed and burned what 
one Commission member (who happened to 
be a Republican) said was “a sophisticated and 
nuanced” analysis. Bolton baldly asserted that 
China’s resistance to western pressures in part 
because of the ugly legacy of European interven-
tions in China, but in his view, because they are 
(and I quote him exactly) “fucking Communists.” 
Nuance did not prevail; conservative anger tri-
umphed. Although I was not present when the 
following action occurred, it was reported to me 
after I had left that when the Commission later 
came to discuss the religious-freedom policies of 
United States ally Saudi Arabia, the same conser-
vatives who wished to attack Sudan and China in 
unnuanced terms suddenly came to the position 
that it would be best to moderate any criticism of 
America’s oil-rich ally, Saudi Arabia. (The USCIRF 
later began to condemn Saudi Arabia.)
Fourth, one U.S. Senator whom I had long admired, 
Richard Lugar, a Republican of Indiana, neverthe-
less fell victim to a double standard. When newly 
elected President Barak Obama nominated his 
first Ambassador for International Religious Free-
dom, Senator Lugar, then-Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, sent a long list of 
sharp questions to the nominee about what she 
would do about a series of violations of religious 
freedom across the world, from China, to Sudan, 
to Vietnam, to Laos, to Russia, and elsewhere. The 
clear thrust of his letter was to make sure that she 
would be a valiant promoter of religious freedom 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe41
wherever it might be under threat anywhere in 
the world. By coincidence, at the same time that 
he sent that letter, there was a controversy in New 
York City about the construction of what came to 
be called the “Ground Zero Mosque,” even though 
it was not a mosque (it was a community center) 
and it was not at “ground zero” (the location of 
the World Trade Center), but a few blocks away. 
There was sharp opposition from many parts of 
the American community to Muslims erecting 
such a building near the sacred site where many 
had lost their lives. (In my personal opinion, the 
opposition was principally due to bias and irratio-
nal hostility against Islam.) When asked about his 
position on the propriety of erecting the Muslim 
building in New York City, Senator Lugar – the 
same man who courageously insisted that the 
Obama administration promote religious freedom 
throughout the entire world – said that the New 
York facility was a “local decision” and that he had 
no comment.70 He demanded religious freedom 
for Chinese Christians living in Nanjing but not 
for his fellow-Americans living in New York City.
Conclusion 
Underlying many aspects of this issue, and deserv-
ing of much more nuance than I can provide here, 
is what I believe to be a presumption from part 
of the American community that religious free-
dom should not be understood as being a neutral 
standard to be uniformly applied, but as a tactical 
weapon to be used to advance both religious and 
political agenda. 
70. Greg Sargent, “Senator Lugar won’t take position on 
‘mosque,’ Washington Post, Aug. 27, 2010 http://voices.
washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/08/senator_
lugar_wont_take_positi.html.
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Supporting 
Subversion? 
International 
Organisations 
and ‘Freedom of 
Conscience’ in 
Islamic States
by MATTHEW J. NELSON71
If you are a Muslim in Negeri Sembilan—a state 
in peninsular Malaysia—you may appear before a 
state-level shari‘ah court judge to renounce Islam. 
Initially, the judge will refer you to an Islamic Faith 
Rehabilitation Centre for up to three months of 
remedial counseling regarding the fate of your 
soul, your community, and perhaps the state as a 
whole. After this, if you fail to ‘repent’, your case 
will be adjourned for a year. However, if you insist 
on leaving Islam even after this year, you will be 
permitted to do so.72 
71. Reader Department of Politics, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London
72. Islamic law is a state-level (provincial) law in Malay-
sia. In some parts of Malaysia detention in the Islamic 
Faith Rehabilitation Centre is extended to as much as 
thirty-six months. In other parts detention is followed 
by a fine, imprisonment, and/or lashing. In some states 
applications for apostasy are not accepted at all. See 
Some see Negeri Sembilan’s period of mandatory 
counseling as a period of mandatory detention. 
Their concerns often prompt them to favour Sin-
gapore’s approach, in which obligatory counseling 
is not combined with any detention. 
Occasionally, Muslim scholars insist that such 
‘concessions’ to human rights norms (regarding 
freedom of conscience) should be avoided—that, 
within an Islamic state like Malaysia, apostates 
should be killed. Others note that ‘there is no com-
pulsion in religion’ (including rehabilitative deten-
tion)—indeed, that Islamic law has no objection to 
apostasy so long as it is not combined with sedi-
tious forms of evangelism targeting the existence 
of Islam itself. 
My question is this: Is it possible to read Negeri 
Sembilan’s approach to the regulation of apos-
tasy as part of a wider effort to ‘translate’ global 
human rights norms—in this case, freedom of con-
science—into contexts framed by Islam? Before I 
address this question, I will turn to a second case in 
which shifting ties with religion are read through 
deeply contextualized political lenses.
During the final years of the Cold War education 
specialists at the University of Nebraska (Omaha) 
received U.S. government funding to prepare text-
books for Afghan refugee children living in Paki-
stan. Training would-be mujahideen to fight the 
Soviets, the textbooks were saturated with reli-
gious content: ‘A’ is for Allah; ‘J’ is for Jihad; and so 
on.73 
Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, ‘Restrictions on Free-
dom of Religion in Malaysia: A Conceptual Analysis 
with Special Reference to the Law of Apostasy’, Muslim 
World Journal of Human Rights 4:2 (2007), 1-24. 
73. See Craig Davis, ‘“A” is for Allah, “J” is for Jihad’, World 
Policy Journal 19:1 (2002), pp. 90-94.
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After 9/11 American, U.S. funding poured back 
into Pakistan to support various types of educa-
tion reform. Religious education was a source of 
particular concern, but this time American offi-
cials insisted that the U.S. Constitution prohibited 
any ‘meddling’ in religious affairs. U.S. funding 
could be used to buy computers for local schools 
and madrasas, but curricular matters involving an 
alternative interpretation of Islam were off-limits. 
These American debates about the reach of the 
First Amendment (abroad) point to a wider strug-
gle regarding the translation of specific ‘rights’ 
protections—in this case, protections pertain-
ing to freedom of religion—into different con-
stitutional contexts. Does the First Amendment 
imply that U.S. officials are allergic to religion (in 
general), or does it imply that U.S. constitutional 
allergies pertain to ‘religious establishment’ within 
the United States? How should U.S. foreign policy 
engagements with religion engage religion without 
prompting concerns about a risk of subversion?
The Politics of Subversion 
in Establishment and Non-
Establishment States
Within these two vignettes I perceive a global 
struggle surrounding efforts to translate a univer-
sal freedom of religion/belief/conscience within 
two different types of states, namely, ‘non-estab-
lishment’ and ‘establishment’ states. This struggle 
unfolds on two levels; one concerns apostasy (as 
a matter of human rights pertaining to individual 
belief); the other concerns sedition (as a political 
matter pertaining to the stability of a particular 
constitutional order). Small shifts involving indi-
vidual apostates and narrow funding streams are 
often seen—as they were in these vignettes—as 
the first step on a slippery slope to mass conver-
sion and political subversion. 
When a Muslim in Malaysia leaves Islam, for 
example, some argue that he threatens the Islamic 
constitutional order of Malaysia. (At the very least, 
he might be said to threaten the demographic-
cum-political balance of Malaysia—not unlike 
a convert in a fragile ‘consociational’ setting like 
Lebanon.) When U.S. government officials spend 
money on ‘Islamic’ education in Pakistan, some 
argue that they threaten the constitutional order 
of American ‘non-establishment’. Briefly stated, 
Malaysian apostates and U.S. government funders 
of Islamic education are engaged in transgressive 
political acts with allegedly ‘existential’ (constitu-
tional) implications. 
If this were not the case, there would be no ques-
tion of any link between efforts to engage religion 
(or leave it) and the laws protecting a given consti-
tutional order. Why does the ‘established’ Islamic 
state of Malaysia care whether the Muslims living 
within its borders leave Islam? Why does the ‘non-
established’ secular constitution of the United 
States care whether its President is engaged with 
‘religious’ actors abroad? It is not difficult to see 
that, in Malaysia and the U.S., the issue of ‘reli-
gious’ affiliation closely tied to concerns about 
‘political’ subversion. Indeed, only the most naïve 
human rights observers are prepared to suggest 
that apostasy is actually limited to questions of 
private freedom.
For centuries, Muslim scholars have been par-
ticularly astute in tying questions of conscience 
to questions of political order. They have noted, 
in particular, that, when it comes to questions of 
conscience, the question is never ‘how should free-
dom be protected as an absolute value’, but rather, 
focusing on the shifting interplay of com-peting 
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domestic forces (typically in collaboration with 
competing allies abroad), ‘how should freedom of 
conscience be regulated as an expression of con-
stitutional control’?74
Some argue that would-be apostates must be 
‘monitored’ to prevent destabilizing forms of con-
version. Others argue that consciences should be 
free to roam so long as the wider constitutional 
order—say, establishment or non-establishment—
is strictly protected in the end. In fact these two 
options may work together: small shifts involv-
ing individual apostates and tiny adjustments in 
official foreign policy engagements may be moni-
tored in a bid to protect or advance a particular 
constitutional order. 
When domestic legal concerns regarding subver-
sion (or sedition) are acknowledged, the basic 
question regarding international human rights 
norms tends to shift. What is the process whereby 
individual freedom might be protected, as a uni-
versal value, within both ‘establishment’ and ‘non-
establishment’ contexts? 
Indeed, returning to the question I posed at the 
outset: Would it be fair to say that Negeri Sembi-
lan’s Faith Rehabilitation Centres combine inter-
national support for ‘individual’ freedom of con-
science with a robust acknowledgment of ‘sover-
eign’ constitutional orders? And, turning to the 
U.S. Could the U.S. government endorse these 
rehabilitation centres abroad without, at the same 
time, violating its commitment to ‘domestic’ non-
establishment?
These are the questions that interest me: What does 
it mean for U.S. officials to protect ‘freedom of 
74. Frank Griffel, ‘Toleration and Exclusion: Al-Shafi’i and 
al-Ghazali on the Treatment of Apostates’, Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies 84:3 (2001), 
pp. 339-354.
conscience’ abroad (for example, with reference 
to Malaysia) while, at the same time, noting that 
‘non-establishment’ is not a universal constitu-
tional principle? What are the issues that ‘inter-
national’ efforts to protect freedom of conscience 
should consider within an explicitly ‘Islamic’ state? 
Indeed, turning to Malaysia, how should an explic-
itly ‘Islamic’ state deal with ‘freedom of conscience’ 
in a set of domestic laws (regarding subversion) 
that are, nevertheless, influenced by conversations 
regarding international human rights norms? 
How should Malaysia ‘translate’ its commitment 
to religious establishment during its conversations 
with powerful international partners? 
If, properly understood, establishment and non-
establishment boil down to domestic constitu-
tional orders that address the relationship between 
religion and sedition, how do they travel ‘abroad’? 
‘International’ Americans in 
‘Muslim’ Asia 
This past September I was in Kuala Lumpur attend-
ing a workshop led by an American organisation 
that funds governance and development projects 
in Asia. The workshop sought to chart the future 
of an innovative human rights and development 
programme working with Muslim religious lead-
ers in various Asian countries. During the work-
shop two issues broadly related to the themes of 
this chapter stood out. 
The first issue concerned the value of working 
with religious leaders—in this case, thousands of 
mullahs—to enhance the organisation’s access to 
local communities and, thus, to improve its abil-
ity to deliver various projects related to the rights 
of women. The organisation acknowledged that, 
over the years, its close relationships with secu-
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lar human rights organizations, including many 
feminist organizations, had tied it to a smaller and 
smaller portion of the local population. By engag-
ing local mullahs, the organisation hoped to cor-
rect this ‘access’ imbalance.
Even as its work with local mullahs expanded, 
however, its relations with donor agencies soured. 
In fact the organisation found itself on the horns 
of a dilemma: ‘access’ to local communities versus 
‘access’ to international resources. Indeed, precisely 
insofar as this was the case, the workshop devel-
oped a somewhat ‘existential’ tone. What defined 
the core mission of the organisation: did its push to 
engage local mullahs as religious partners amount to 
a form of (‘secular’) constitutional betrayal? Indeed, 
how would they sell a project delivered by thou-
sands of local mullahs to an audience framed by 
notions of domestic political accountability in the 
centre of Washington, D.C.?
Resolving that its primary commitments lay with 
local communities, the second issue concerned the 
quality of its engagement with local mullahs. Did 
its own human rights orientation converge with 
the religious orientation of its local partners? And, 
if not, should the organisation attempt to access 
the mullahs’ grassroots networks while, at the same 
time, controlling their programmatic language? 
Eventually, the organisation managed to convince 
itself that its core values did not conflict with those 
of its religious partners—that, notwithstanding 
certain forms of gendered differentiation, there 
was nothing in the Qur’anic language preferred 
by its partners that cut against the organ-isation’s 
core understanding of basic human rights. 
Still, the leaders of the organisation lamented their 
loss of control over the mode of articulating those 
rights. While it appreciated the ways in which 
local mullahs set about using religious refer-
ences to challenge discriminatory local customs, it 
lamented the fact that its partners did not discuss 
(a) ‘freedom of conscience’ as a principle or (b) the 
‘principle’ of religious non-establishment. Instead, 
local mullahs began from a position of explicit 
‘establishment’, accusing local ‘sinners’ of straying 
from the true path of Islam in order to enhance the 
reach of women’s rights.
For the Americans, the price of local ‘access’ was 
not defined in terms of specific programmatic 
objectives. The price unfolded at the level of local 
language and direct discursive control. Briefly 
stated, the Americans found that, in their bid to 
make local mullahs the foundation of their pro-
gramme—indeed, in their bid to ‘translate’ a par-
ticular set of rights provisions into a more persua-
sive local idiom—they were involved in funding 
what might be described as the women’s-rights 
equivalent of Malaysia’s ‘faith rehabilitation centres’: 
translating a particular understanding of rights via 
Islamic institutions and Muslim partners. 
In the end, the American organisation managed 
to convince itself that its programmatic objec-
tives were being met, even as the mullahs came 
to believe that collaborating with an international 
organisation did not amount to an existential ‘con-
stitutional’ threat.
Conclusion
Of course Malaysia’s Islamic Faith Rehabilitation 
Centres are vilified, both by human rights advo-
cates (who see them as an obnoxious constraint 
on private religious belief) and by conservative 
Muslim clerics (who see them as encouraging, or 
at least allowing, apostasy). The American pro-
gramme described above has also faced pointed 
criticism, both on the part of secular donors (who 
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object to the role of local mullahs in delivering a 
women’s rights agenda) and on the part of Muslim 
clerics (who worry that a ‘foreign’ organization is 
using local mullahs to dismantle explicitly gen-
dered Muslim norms). 
Moving away from its non-establishment prin-
ciples in the direction of its partners’ establish-
ment principles, however, the American organisa-
tion discovered that, even in the case of women’s 
rights, it may be possible to have its human rights 
‘content’ without direct control over the language 
adopted by local mullahs. And of course lawmak-
ers in Negeri Sembilan found that it may be pos-
sible to Islamise the process of apostasy in ways 
that ‘permit’ individual freedom of conscience. In 
both cases, the most important risk—namely, the 
risk of existential political subversion—was care-
fully (albeit implicitly) avoided. 
Apostasy is interesting because, although it appears 
to unfold at the level of individual belief, it is, in 
fact, closely related to the possibility of mass con-
version and, thus, the possibility of political sub-
version. Apostasy is interesting because, politically, 
individual consciences always stand in for domes-
tic (and international) pressures that threaten 
an existing constitutional order. That order may 
involve specific forms of ‘establishment’; it may 
involve the principle of ‘non-establishment’. The 
question is never whether subversion will be regu-
lated. The question is simply how.
Ultimately, the laws prevailing in Negeri Sembi-
lan simply extend the process of social-ization we 
encounter in public schools and other state-sanc-
tioned obligatory domains. If anything, the ‘per-
missiveness’ of the law in Negeri Sembilan helps 
to guard against the normative totalitarianism of 
an ‘established’ religious state. 
American organisations that spend U.S. govern-
ment funds in support of religious groups abroad 
extend the reach of American power in ways that 
preserve U.S. constitutional principles regarding 
‘domestic’ non-establishment. Refusing to work 
with religious groups in established religious states 
would probably illicit greater concerns in those 
places—concerns about subversion that might 
limit America’s ability to press for the advance-
ment of human rights. 
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The role of 
the European 
Parliament 
in helping to 
protect freedom 
of religion or 
belief via the 
EU’s external 
relations
by DR. CORNELIS (DENNIS) DE JONG75
Introduction
Before my election as a Member of the European 
Parliament, in 2009, I worked in the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Special Advisor on 
75. Dennis de Jong is Member of the European Parlia-
ment since 2009. He represents the Dutch Socialist 
Party. Before he entered politics, De Jong worked for 
various ministries in the Netherlands, inter alia, on 
human rights issues, as well as in the fields of asy-
lum and immigration, and anti-corruption policies. 
In 2000, he obtained his doctorate at the University 
of Maastricht on the basis of his thesis ‘The Freedom 
of Thought, Conscience and Religion or Belief in the 
United Nations’ (Intersentia, ISBN 90-5095-137-6).
Human Rights and Good Governance. One of 
my main responsibilities was to help in address-
ing issues relating to religion or belief. This con-
cerned not only the protection of freedom of reli-
gion or belief as part of the Netherlands’ external 
human rights policies, but also the formulation of 
policies addressing religious tensions in the world, 
either through specific diplomatic initiatives, or 
as part of development co-operation. This meant, 
for example, that I was fully involved in the dip-
lomatic efforts to reduce tensions in the Islamic 
world following the issuing of the film Fitna by the 
Dutch MP Geert Wilders. I also set up the Knowl-
edge Forum on Religion and Belief and Develop-
ment, which was aimed at bringing together the 
expertise of NGOs and the ministry concerning 
the actual and potential role of religious and belief 
institutions in development and peace-building.
During my time at the Foreign Office, I noticed 
that it is sometimes difficult for diplomats to 
remain objective in matters relating to religion 
or belief. This is the case for those who adhere to 
a specific religious belief and may be tempted to 
focus on violations of the freedom to manifest that 
belief, whilst ignoring violations against members 
of other religions or beliefs. It is also true of those 
who view religion as something of the past and 
have adopted non-theistic or even atheistic beliefs. 
They are entitled to their point of view, but they 
will have to bear in mind that according to the 
UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 
Religion or Belief76, ‘religion or belief for anyone 
who professes either, is one of the fundamental 
elements in his conception of life and that free-
dom of religion or belief should be fully respected 
and guaranteed’. In both instances it is important 
to realise that, according to the UN Human Rights 
76. Proclaimed by GA Res. 36/55 of 25 November 1981
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Committee77, freedom of religion or belief protects 
the freedom to manifest theistic, non-theistic and 
atheistic beliefs. Thus, international human rights 
standards prescribe even-handedness, while leav-
ing no room for bias based on any personal views 
or beliefs.
In the context of classical human rights policies, 
the principle of even-handedness is perhaps still 
generally accepted within the various ministries 
of Foreign Affairs. It becomes more complicated 
when the question is raised as to whether religious 
institutions should be seen as important partners 
for the promotion of human rights, good gover-
nance and development more generally. Many 
fear privileged treatment of religious institutions 
or stereotyping groups in societies along religious 
lines. However, religious institutions tend to have 
wide, long-standing networks covering regions 
that are less accessible for embassies, and thus 
they can provide embassies, especially in devel-
oping countries, with important information on 
development issues in especially regarding these 
less accessible regions. It is also well known that 
after a peace settlement has been negotiated, the 
international community often leaves the coun-
try, or at least partially. Religious institutions can 
then provide for the necessary follow-up action, in 
particular through targeted reconciliation efforts. 
Thus, it is important to keep relations open, not in 
order to privilege religious institutions, but rather 
to take advantage when partnerships can bring 
mutual benefits. That is precisely what we tried to 
establish with the Knowledge Forum on Religion 
and Belief and Development.
77. Paragraph 2 of General Comment No. 22 (CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.4).
The first steps towards a 
group of like-minded MEPsI. Role of the European Parliament with respect 
to the EU’s external relations
Although with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the European Parliament obtained many 
new powers, this did not apply to the EU’s exter-
nal policies, which remain largely the prerogative 
of Member States. However, in the same manner 
that co-operation between Member States has 
steadily increased in this area, so too has the dia-
logue between the Council, the European Exter-
nal Action Service, and the Commission and the 
European Parliament.
The European Parliament has adopted numerous 
resolutions with regard to external human rights 
policies. Moreover, the Parliament must agree 
to the budget lines relating to co-operation with 
third countries, and does not hesitate to make its 
support conditional upon specific requirements 
regarding, inter alia, the human rights dialogue 
with these countries. Finally, the Parliament also 
maintains its own external relations with parlia-
ments in third countries. 
Although – also for me personally – there are many 
other competing policy areas requiring attention, I 
have always held the view that the combination of 
the, albeit limited instruments for the Parliament 
to exert influence over the EU’s external relations, 
and my own expertise could perhaps make it pos-
sible to build on the Dutch practices and espe-
cially make the EEAS fully prepared for dealing 
with issues of religion or belief in the context of 
foreign and development policies.
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II. Building a coalition of like-minded MEPs
Within the European Parliament, there already 
existed several groups dealing with religion or 
belief. A number of MEPs were working on ini-
tiatives focusing in particular on the protection of 
Christians world-wide. Another group of MEPs 
developed itself as a watchdog to promote separa-
tion of Church and State at EU level. However, in 
2009 no group of MEPs existed yet concentrating 
on the protection of all religions or beliefs.
Against this background, I started with the organ-
isation, in 2009, of a special ‘event’ on freedom of 
religion or belief and the EU’s external policies. 
With the help of the Spanish Presidency and a 
number of other representatives from Member 
States’ Foreign Offices, we engaged in a lively debate 
on the need for EU guidelines on the protection of 
the freedom of religion or belief. Such guidelines 
could help in defining when the EU should take 
action in the case of violations of this freedom. It 
was a useful and constructive debate, in which not 
only many NGO-representatives participated, but 
also a number of interested MEPs. 
By organising such an event and by carefully not-
ing which MEPs are taking part either themselves 
or through their assistants, one gets to know one’s 
potential allies. Of course, I continued to organise 
special events, either on specific aspects of free-
dom of religion or belief, or on particular country 
situations. There were always NGOs which were 
able to provide me with essential information, 
including on useful speakers during the events. 
Eventually, it was possible to find MEPs in all main 
groups who want to spend part of their time and 
energy, as well as (human) resources working on 
the protection of freedom of religion or belief. 
With this group, we developed our contacts with 
the EEAS and had a couple of meetings with, inter 
alia, the Deputy Secretary-General of the EEAS, 
Maciej Popowski. These meetings were construc-
tive and provided us with better insights as to how 
the EEAS was dealing with the issue.
Part of this process was the elaboration of a work-
ing paper by the group of like-minded MEPs to 
be transmitted to the EEAS. It contained a num-
ber of recommendations for the working methods 
of the EEAS, as well as an Annex with the main 
areas or developments of concern. In that respect, 
our paper was, to an extent, comparable to the 
annual reports of the US Commission on Inter-
national Religious Freedom. However, that is also 
where the comparison comes to a halt: unlike the 
USCIRF, our group did not have the capacity for 
thorough analyses, and all we could manage to do 
was to collect existing material and select a num-
ber of concrete themes that struck us as particu-
larly worrisome.III. The transition from informal network to 
‘working group’
We discovered that, although the relations with 
the EEAS remained very positive, there were limi-
tations to what an informal dialogue can achieve. 
The response from the EEAS to our working doc-
ument remained rather general and although we 
sent a follow-up request trying to get more definite 
answers, all we received back was the promise that 
the EEAS would participate in a further meeting. 
I can understand this: after all, our document was 
not officially approved by the EP, and therefore the 
EEAS could not do more than keep the dialogue 
informal and its responses less formal than might 
otherwise have been the case.
This year, I consulted all members of the group, 
trying to find common ground for a certain degree 
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of formalisation of our work. In this respect, it was 
important that, during his visit to the EP, the then-
chair of the USCIRF, Mr. Leonard Leo, told me 
that USCIRF was looking to networks like ours. 
For example, in the German Bundestag a similar 
network exists and USCIRF considers this to be 
one of their counterparts, as an official Commis-
sion like in the USA does not exist anywhere in 
Europe. It would only be logical to liaise in a com-
parable manner as EP-network with USCIRF.
On 17 December 2012, the ‘working group on the 
protection of freedom of religion or belief ’ was 
launched in presence of the EU Special Represen-
tative on Human Rights, Mr. Stavros Lambrinidis. 
In this way, the network has become more vis-
ible, both inside and outside the Parliament, and 
already many MEPs and NGOs have indicated 
their interest in working with the network. In 
order to embed our work in the EP’s general work 
on human rights, it is important that the network 
contributes to the work of the Sub-Committee on 
Human Rights (DROI), which is responsible for 
the (external) human rights reports of the EP. After 
a very positive meeting with the chair of DROI, we 
concluded that it is possible to contribute to the 
EP’s annual reports on human rights. By collect-
ing information throughout the year and submit-
ting this to the Rapporteur, preferably when s/he is 
still in the process of drafting the report, it should 
be possible to include in these reports a specific 
chapter on the protection of freedom of religion 
or belief. This way, the dialogue with the EEAS 
will become more formal, as we can refer back to a 
text adopted by the EP as a whole. Finally, we shall 
also try to incorporate specific declarations to be 
added to the budget lines on external relations. For 
example, in the context of an external agreement 
with a specific country, we can emphasize that the 
human rights dialogue should concentrate on cer-
tain concerns we may have regarding the protec-
tion of the freedom of religion or belief.
In January 2013, we shall present a working pro-
gramme for 2013, which will consist of a range of 
events, of submissions to DROI, as well as of contri-
butions to the discussions on the budget of the EU.
Guidelines
From the very beginning, the network recom-
mended to the EEAS to write draft guidelines on 
the protection of freedom of religion or belief. 
One of the main characteristics of this freedom is 
its many possible forms of manifestation. In a way, 
one could argue that freedom of religion or belief 
can be seen as the litmus test for the protection of 
all human rights, since, for example, freedom of 
expression, and freedom of assembly and of asso-
ciation are in a specific way part of the freedom 
of religion or belief, as are many other individual 
human rights. The international human rights 
treaties recognise not only the right to have or to 
change one’s religion or belief, but also the right 
to manifest it both in public and in private. The 
right to build a church, temple or mosque are just 
as much part of the freedom of religion or belief, 
as the right to write and acquire materials relat-
ing to one’s religion or belief, and the right to wear 
religious apparel. Unlike the forum internum (the 
right to have or to change one’s religion or belief), 
the external manifestations (the forum externum) 
are not absolute rights. They may be limited, but 
only in accordance with the strictly worded limita-
tion clauses of these treaties.
There are therefore two main challenges for dip-
lomats who want to be active in protecting the 
freedom of religion or belief: the rich variety of 
manifestations, and the fact that certain limita-
tions of the freedom to manifest may be legitimate, 
whereas others are clear violations of international 
human rights law. For the European Union to take 
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action, a certain degree of seriousness must exist. 
This requires (1) evidence that the freedom has 
been limited, (2) that this was not in conformity 
with the requirements laid down in the grounds of 
limitation, and (3) that it does not concern an iso-
lated case, but that there is a pattern of violations, 
for which the government can be held responsible, 
either because it is involved in the violations itself, 
or because it has been negligent in preventing 
them, in protecting the believers and in prosecut-
ing the perpetrators. 
Guidelines are essential in setting priorities. It is 
possible to describe the type of violation and the 
type of pattern that must lead to EU action. It 
will be more difficult to describe in detail which 
limitations will be permissible. This depends very 
much on the specific circumstances and even 
amongst Member States there are differences: for 
example, some Member States see no harm in pro-
hibiting the wearing of a burqa in public, while 
other Member States are of the opinion that such 
a general prohibition would constitute a violation 
of the right to wear religious apparel. It is clear that 
EU actions should not concern cases in which one 
can have differing opinions on their permissibility. 
The guidelines should concentrate on serious and 
persisting violations of the freedom of religion or 
belief. For example, the systematic discrimination 
against certain religious minorities calls for EU 
action, as does the deliberate destruction of reli-
gious buildings and sites. 
Although originally, the draft guidelines were to 
be published for consultation in 2012, this has not 
yet happened. A previous version had been infor-
mally shared by the EEAS with the Parliament’s 
Secretariat and members of the working group 
had already been asked to prepare their com-
ments by the Bureau of DROI. However, it soon 
transpired that this version had been considered 
overly-long and that the EEAS was already work-
ing on a shorter version. Although the working 
group was impressed with the efforts undertaken, 
it also noted that the guidelines failed to indicate 
‘red lines’ for embassies and delegations, i.e. the 
type of violations which require immediate diplo-
matic action. In an even shorter version this may 
become yet more difficult, but without such clear 
markers, the guidelines risk having no practical 
effect. As soon as the draft guidelines are available, 
the working group will draw up comments, spe-
cifically focusing on this question.
Focal point
Apart from the call for guidelines, the network 
has also asked EEAS to make at least one of their 
officials responsible for matters relating to religion 
or belief. Such a focal point could help in co-ordi-
nating the various activities, not only in respect of 
human rights policies, but also as far as the role 
of religious institutions in third countries are 
concerned. As pointed out above, the role of such 
institutions in reconciliation efforts, in the promo-
tion of good governance (anti-corruption) and in 
development as a whole cannot be overestimated.
Although originally we were seriously concerned 
with the fact that it took a long time before a cru-
cial vacancy within the EEAS was filled and desk 
work could be stepped up within that service, more 
recent developments are promising. The vacancy 
has been filled, the EEAS has become much more 
active and the Special Representative for Human 
Rights of the EEAS takes a personal interest in the 
matter. Thus, the working group is confident that 
under his guidance, the idea of a focal point may 
be further explored.
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We also hope that the inclusion of a special chapter 
on freedom of religion or belief in the EP’s annual 
report on human rights will lead to a permanent 
dialogue with the EEAS on our main concerns. 
Now that the structure is in place, we must move 
on to the work on the ground. By collecting infor-
mation in an ever more professional manner, we 
should, like the USCIRF, be in a position to have a 
meaningful dialogue on country situations and on 
developments of concern.
Conclusion
It always takes a long time to master the proce-
dures in Brussels. However, by building a non-
partisan coalition, individual MEPs can exert suf-
ficient influence to make things move. Within the 
EP, the various tendencies described above will 
continue to exist. Some MEPs will remain espe-
cially concerned with the plight of Christians, and 
considering the ever more difficult situation for 
these groups in parts of the world, it is legitimate 
to include their concerns in our work. However, 
we shall have to remain even-handed, as has also 
been expressed by DROI as one of its main con-
cerns. Persecution of religious minorities needs to 
be dealt with, irrespective of the religion or belief 
concerned. On this basis, the network is convinced 
that it will be possible to continue to find common 
ground and to make progress in furthering the pro-
tection of freedom of religion or belief world-wide.
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The European 
External Action 
Service and 
Freedom of 
Religion or 
Belief
by JEAN BERNARD BOLVIN78
Introduction
It is not that often that scholars, diplomats, mem-
bers of parliament, religious leaders and practitio-
ners are able to share views on Freedom of Reli-
gion or Belief (FoRB). I welcome this opportunity 
which is a perfect occasion to have a look at FoRB 
from different angles. The EEAS has developed 
activities in the field of FoRB, in line with the 
overall EU engagement on this issue. As regards 
to some of the views expressed earlier during this 
workshop, even though not directly linked to the 
EU’s action, I would like to make the point that 
the EU is not promoting any “hidden agenda” in 
78. Desk Officier, Human Rights Policy Instruments Unit, 
European External Action Service. This presentation 
was made in a personal capacity of the author and 
does not reflect the position of the European Union, 
the European Commission or the European External 
Action Service
defending and promoting FoRB worldwide. And I 
am really confident that the EU, while enhancing 
work on this fundamental right, is far from being 
engaged in any “self-satisfactory exercise”.
The rise of religious 
intolerance and the EU action
Over the last few years, as the world witnessed a 
surge of acts of religious intolerance and discrimi-
nation, as epitomised by violence and terrorist 
attacks in various countries, such as Egypt, Iraq, 
Nigeria, or many other countries, the EU has been 
increasingly dedicated to the promotion and pro-
tection of FoRB. This freedom protects the right to 
have theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as 
well as the right not to profess any religion. It also 
covers the right to adopt, change or abandon one’s 
religion or belief of one’s own free will. The EU 
takes the view that freedom of religion or belief is 
a fundamental right to which everyone is entitled, 
outside and within the EU, and that the defence of 
such universal principles is essential to the devel-
opment of free societies. It has to be made clear 
though that the EU does not associate itself with 
any specific religion or belief: all must be treated in 
an indiscriminate manner, everywhere. 
Discrimination based on religion or belief is a 
long-lasting concern in all regions of the world, 
and persons belonging to particular religious 
communities continue to be targeted in many 
countries. Moreover, legislation on defamation of 
religions has often been used to mistreat religious 
minorities and to limit freedom of opinion and 
expression as well as freedom of religion or belief 
itself, two fundamental freedoms which are intrin-
sically linked. Freedom of expression also plays an 
important role in the fight against intolerance. 
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In line with previous Council conclusions of 16 
November 200979, the Foreign Affairs Council 
adopted conclusions on 21 February 201180 reaf-
firming the EU’s strong commitment on FoRB, and 
recalled that it needed to be protected everywhere 
and for everyone. They stressed the fact that it is 
the primary duty of States to protect their citizens, 
including persons belonging to religious minori-
ties, as well as all people living in their jurisdiction, 
and safeguard their rights. All persons belonging 
to religious minorities should be able to practice 
their religion and worship freely, individually or 
in community with others, without fear of intoler-
ance and attacks.
Subsequently, the EU reminded all EU Delega-
tions that they had, alongside with Member States 
diplomatic missions, a crucial role to play in mak-
ing tangible positive impact as regard respect for 
FoRB in third countries where this fundamental 
human right is violated or challenged.
EU Delegations were therefore formally asked to 
conduct actions to raise awareness among EU dip-
lomats on the issue, to engage with the authorities 
of partner countries on a systematic manner on 
FoRB, especially those where it is seen as a major 
issue, and to develop contacts with local human 
rights defenders working on such rights. Delega-
tions have since then been engaged in close moni-
toring of restrictions to FoRB in their respective 
host countries. Their assessments of the local situ-
79. See Council conclusions on freedom of religion or 
belief, 2973rd GENERAL AFFAIRS Council meeting, 
Brussels, 16 November 2009, available at: http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/111190.pdf 
80. See Council conclusions on intolerance, discrimina-
tion and violence on the basis of religion or belief, 
3069th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, Brussels, 
21 February 2011, available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/
genaff/119404.pdf 
ations, provided on more than 100 countries, are 
being currently updated under the Human Rights 
Country Strategies framework.
Over the last years, the EU also made an increased 
use of existing tools at bilateral and multilateral 
levels to more effectively promote and protect 
freedom of religion or belief. The ad hoc Coun-
cil Working Group on Human Rights Task Force 
on FoRB carried on supporting the implementa-
tion of the EU’s enhanced actions and helped to 
develop guidance for the use of the EU diplomats. 
The topic has been included in the human rights 
training provided to the EU staff. 
In relations with non-EU countries, freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion has been system-
atically raised with a high number of interlocutors 
at different levels of political dialogue, including in 
human rights dialogues and consultations.
The EU has engaged bilaterally with various 
countries on the crucial importance of this uni-
versal human right, and explored possibilities of 
further cooperation, including at the multilateral 
fora. Under these dialogues the EU has voiced 
its concerns regarding the implementation of 
this right and the situation of religious minori-
ties. Whenever prompted by serious violations 
and concerns regarding religious freedom and 
related intolerance and discrimination, the EU has 
expressed its views via diplomatic channels, public 
statements and Council Conclusions. It has con-
tinued to advocate full respect for the freedom of 
thought and conscience, in line with international 
standards. Furthermore, the current process of 
establishing country human rights strategies will 
allow to focus EU action and attention in coun-
tries where FoRB is a priority.
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EU action has also concerned the multilateral level, 
notably in the Human Rights Council in Geneva 
and at the United Nations General Assembly in 
New York. Priority was given to the consolida-
tion of the consensus on the need to fight religious 
intolerance, whilst  avoiding the concept of defa-
mation of religion to be claimed as a human rights 
standard. Such a notion, which aims at protecting 
religion in itself rather than persons discriminated 
because of their religion or belief is detrimental 
to other core human rights, such as freedom of 
expression. 
At the 16th session of the Human Rights Coun-
cil, in march 2011, an important breakthrough 
was achieved with the adoption by consensus of 
resolution 16/18: for the first time, the Organiza-
tion of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) did not include 
the concept of defamation of religion in its resolu-
tion, now entitled “Combating intolerance, negative 
stereotyping and stigmatisation of, and discrimina-
tion, incitement to violence and violence against 
persons based on religion or belief”81. Efforts by 
Pakistan and the United States of America, with 
active EU support, were instrumental in achieving 
this result. The traditional EU resolution on free-
dom of religion or belief was also adopted without 
a vote (resolution 16/13)82.
High Representative and Vice-President of the 
Commission Catherine Ashton and several For-
eign Affairs ministers from EU Member States 
81. UN Human Rights Council,  Combating intolerance, 
negative stereotyping and stigmatization of, and dis-
crimination, incitement to violence, and violence against 
persons based on religion or belief : resolution / adopted 
by the Human Rights Council, 12 April 2011, A/HRC/
RES/16/18,  available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ref-
world/docid/4db960f92.html
82. UN Human Rights Council,  Freedom of religion or 
belief : resolution / adopted by the Human Rights Coun-
cil, 12 April 2011,  A/HRC/RES/16/13,  available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4db95c7c2.html
joined the Istanbul meeting (launching the so 
called “Istanbul process”) convened in June 2011 
by the OIC and the USA on the fight against reli-
gious intolerance, whose objective was to consoli-
date the gains obtained in Geneva in view of the 
forthcoming 66th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly. The OIC/USA Co-Chairs com-
muniqué called for implementation of resolution 
16/18 whilst referring also to the other resolutions 
on FoRB adopted by consensus. 
At the UNGA 66th session, the EU aimed at consol-
idating achievements of previous years regarding 
its own resolution on the elimination of all forms 
of intolerance and of discrimination based on 
religion or belief and, at the same time, ensuring 
confirmation of the consensual approach taken by 
the OIC in Geneva. Such objectives were met with 
the adoption without vote on 19 December 2011, 
of EU sponsored resolution 66/168, and of OIC 
sponsored resolution 66/197 on combating intol-
erance, negative stereotyping, stigmatization, dis-
crimination, incitement to violence and violence 
against persons, based on religion or belief83. 
Last but not least, the Foreign Affairs Council 
adopted on 25 June 2012 the EU Strategic Frame-
work on Human Rights84, along with its Action 
Plan: the elaboration of EU guidelines on freedom 
of religion or belief is one of its early deliverables. 
Such guidelines, which should be adopted in the 
course of 2013, are not legally binding, but they 
represent a strong political signal that these issues 
are priorities for the Union. They will consist in 
83. This approach was upheld in March 2012 in the 19th 
session of the Human Rights Council and in December 
2012 in the 67th session of the UNGA.
84. The full text of the EU Strategic Framework on 
Human Rights is available here: http://www.consil-
ium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/
foraff/131181.pdf 
messages, practical instructions and guidance to 
EU and Member States staff in diplomatic post-
ings and in headquarters on how to assess situa-
tions and to engage in the most pragmatic way.
EEAS action from an “American 
perspective”
I would like to address a few points made by Knox 
Thames in his working paper and who presented 
them earlier during the debate85. The observations 
he made “from an American perspective” on the 
EU approach, notably regarding advancing FoRB 
through the new set of EU guidelines, are highly 
valuable. On the “Czar” on religious freedom 
within the EEAS that he is calling for, I would like 
to point out that, with the recent nomination of 
Stavros Lambrinidis as EU Special Representative 
on Human Rights (EUSR), such an expectation 
might have been fulfilled, even though the EUSR’s 
mandate covers a wide range of issues, including 
FoRB. On the “clear strategy” regarding the guide-
lines and their content, work is underway within 
the EEAS to make sure that the guidelines are as 
inclusive as possible. They will of course address 
both aspects of FoRB (forum internum and forum 
externum). On the funding, I have to say that it 
is the EU’s intention to enhance support to proj-
ects promoting tolerance and dialogue through 
training and awareness raising on FoRB, notably 
through the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR already 
funds projects related to FoRB worldwide. A spe-
cific call for proposals will be launched in spring 
2013, on projects related to the promotion and 
defence of this fundamental freedom. The new 
85. See K. Thames, Making Freedom of Religion or Belief a 
True EU Priority, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2012/41, 
July 2012, available at: http://www.eui.eu/Projects/Reli-
gioWest/Documents/workingpaper/RSCAS2012-41.
pdf 
draft EIDHR Regulation for 2014-2020 includes 
specifically the issue of Freedom of religion or 
belief as a priority issue to be referred to in the 
answers to calls for proposals. 
Conclusion
The work conducted by the EEAS over the last 
month on the elaboration of FoRB guidelines is 
definitely in line with the EU’s dedication to the 
defense and promotion of FoRB over the last years. 
It is a clear sign of the crucial importance that the 
EU attaches to upholding such a fundamental free-
dom. In doing so, the EU is not promoting “occi-
dental” values, but emphasizes the universality of 
such a right, which should be equally enjoyed in 
all parts of the world. 
NB: The EU guidelines on the promotion and 
protection of freedom for religion or belief have 
been adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Coun-
cil on 24 June 2013, after a consultation process 
which involved relevant civil society organisa-
tions, including religious, philosophical and non 
confessional ones. The guidelines have also been 
discussed with the European Parliament and with 
international organisations (OSCE/CoE/UN).
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The United 
States’ Approach 
to Promoting 
International 
Religious 
Freedom: 
the 1998 
International 
Religious 
Freedom Act
by ELIZABETH K. CASSIDY86
Introduction
In October 1998, the U.S. Congress passed and 
President Bill Clinton signed into law the Inter-
national Religious Freedom Act, or IRFA, which 
seeks to make religious freedom a higher prior-
ity in U.S. human rights policy. As more fully 
described below, the law established an official and 
office in the U.S. State Department to focus on reli-
86. Deputy Director of Policy and Research, U.S. Commis-
sion on International Religious Freedom. The views 
expressed here are my own and may or may not reflect 
the views of the Commission. 
gious freedom abroad; mandated the State Depart-
ment to report annually on the issue; required the 
executive branch to designate egregious religious 
freedom violators and seek improvements in those 
countries; and created an independent, biparti-
san advisory commission on the issue, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom 
(USCIRF). 
Congress ultimately adopted IRFA nearly unani-
mously, but there were serious divisions during 
its drafting and consideration, and the law that 
emerged was not what originally was proposed. 
One major issue involved how much discretion 
the law should afford the executive branch. One 
side of this dispute feared too much legislative 
interference in the executive branch’s foreign pol-
icy power, while the other believed the executive 
branch, particularly the State Department, would 
not address religious freedom without outside 
pressure. USCIRF’s creation was an effort to rec-
oncile these two views: the Commission was cre-
ated to be a watchdog over the executive branch’s 
implementation of IRFA (which provided more 
discretion than the second camp wanted), as well 
as a think tank to develop new, but non-binding, 
policy ideas.
Some critics of IRFA incorrectly claim that it 
favors Christians and seeks to promote Chris-
tianity. This misperception is based on the role 
of Christian activists in seeking legislation and 
the fact that the initial, House bill – commonly 
referred to as “Wolf-Specter,” and which would 
have been called “the Freedom from Religious 
Persecution Act” – focused on the persecution of 
certain specified groups, particularly Christians, 
Tibetan Buddhists, and Baha’is, by Islamic and 
Communist governments. However, the bill that 
Congress passed, President Clinton signed, and 
the U.S. government has been implementing for 
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the past 14 years was not Wolf-Specter, but rather a 
Senate bill – “Nickels-Lieberman,” or “the Interna-
tional Religious Freedom Act” – which focuses on 
the internationally-guaranteed right to freedom of 
religion or belief for everyone, everywhere.87
I. IRFA’s Principal 
Provisions
Within the executive branch, IRFA created the 
position of Ambassador at Large for International 
Religious Freedom (a political appointee nomi-
nated by the President and confirmed by the Sen-
ate), to head an international religious freedom 
office at the State Department. It mandated the 
State Department to prepare an annual report 
on religious freedom conditions in each foreign 
country, in addition to the department’s annual 
human rights report. And it required the President 
– who has delegated this power to the Secretary 
of State – to designate as “countries of particular 
concern,” or CPCs, those countries whose gov-
ernments either engage in or tolerate “systematic, 
ongoing, egregious” violations of religious free-
dom, and to take action to encourage improve-
ments in those countries. A variety of actions is 
available from which to choose, from negotiating a 
bilateral agreement to imposing sanctions to issu-
ing a waiver. It also mandated training on religious 
freedom for State Department foreign service offi-
cers and U.S. immigration officials, and included 
religious freedom as an element of U.S. foreign 
assistance, cultural exchange, and international 
broadcasting programs. 
Outside the executive branch, IRFA created 
USCIRF, an independent advisory body mandated 
87. For a detailed description of the legislative history of 
IRFA, see T. Jeremy Gunn, “The United States and the 
Promotion of Freedom of Religion or Belief,” in Facili-
tating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, 
Lindholm, Durham & Tazib-Lie, eds.(2004).
to review religious freedom conditions globally 
and make recommendations for U.S. policy to 
the President, Secretary of State, and Congress, 
including recommending countries for CPC des-
ignation. Although a government entity, USCIRF 
has no policy-making power. All USCIRF policy 
recommendations, including CPC recommenda-
tions, are non-binding, though over the years the 
executive branch and Congress have chosen to 
adopt some of them.
USCIRF is led by nine part-time Commissioners 
appointed by the President and the leadership of 
both political parties in both houses of Congress. 
Three Commissioners are appointed by the White 
House (with no requirement of Senate confirma-
tion), three by House leaders, and three by Senate 
leaders, under a formula such that five Commis-
sioners are appointed by the President’s party and 
four by the other party. The State Department’s 
Ambassador at Large for International Religious 
Freedom also serves ex-officio as a non-voting 
Commissioner. USCIRF has a full-time, non-
partisan professional staff of 14, of whom 7 are 
responsible for research and policy analysis.
USCIRF Commissioners are private citizens who 
serve as volunteers. They are appointed for two 
years and can be reappointed – subject to, as of 
2012, a two-term limit. According to IRFA, Com-
missioners are to be “selected among distinguished 
individuals noted for their knowledge and experi-
ence in fields relevant to the issue of international 
religious freedom, including foreign affairs, direct 
experience abroad, human rights, and interna-
tional law.” Over USCIRF’s life, Commissioners 
have come from a wide range of professional and 
religious backgrounds.
To carry out its work, USCIRF Commissioners 
and staff travel, hold hearings and events, meet 
with a variety of interlocutors, conduct research, 
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testify before Congress, speak to the public and 
the press, and issue written reports and other doc-
uments. We gather information from a wide range 
of sources including U.S. and foreign officials, 
international and regional organizations, human 
rights organizations, religious organizations, and 
academic and policy experts.
USCIRF presents its findings and recommenda-
tions in an annual report, which is issued by May 
1 of each year, and in other publications through-
out the year, all of which are available at www.
uscirf.gov. USCIRF’s annual reports focus on the 
countries it recommends for CPC designation or 
believes are close to the statutory CPC threshold, 
as well as the U.S. executive branch’s implementa-
tion of IRFA, U.S. asylum policy, and religious free-
dom issues at the United Nations and Organization 
of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
To ensure bipartisanship, IRFA requires a quorum 
of six voting Commissioners to conduct USCIRF 
business. This includes determining countries and 
issues to address, approving travel, and approv-
ing recommendations, reports, and other pub-
lications. Commissioners generally have sought 
to reach their decisions by consensus, knowing 
that USCIRF’s recommendations will be more 
persuasive with bipartisan support. In the event 
of disagreements, IRFA expressly allows any 
Commissioner(s) to issue individual or dissenting 
statements, which are designated as such. 
II. Religious Freedom 
Violations under IRFA
IRFA defines violations of religious freedom as 
“violations of the internationally recognized right 
to freedom of religion and religious belief and 
practice” as articulated in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
Helsinki Accords, and other international instru-
ments. Under these instruments, respecting reli-
gious freedom is not only a matter of protecting 
the freedom of religious communities, as groups, 
to engage in worship and other collective activi-
ties. It also encompasses the freedom of every 
individual to hold, or not to hold, any religion or 
belief, as well as the freedom to manifest such a 
religion or belief through worship, practice, teach-
ing, and observance, broadly construed, subject 
to only specified, narrow limitations. Religious 
freedom also is closely related to the freedoms of 
expression, association, and assembly, as well as 
protections of equality and against discrimination. 
The meaning of “religion or belief” is broad, and 
includes theistic, non-theistic, atheistic, agnostic, 
syncretic, “traditional,” “new,” favored, and disfa-
vored beliefs alike, as well as no religion or belief 
at all. USCIRF’s reporting reflects this broad scope. 
For example, we have documented violations 
against and advocated for the religious freedom 
rights of Muslims, Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Sikhs, Baha’is, Jews, Mandaeans, Yazidis, Falun 
Gong, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Scientologists, adherents 
of folk religions, atheists, and secular individuals, 
among others, in the various countries on which 
we report.
As previously mentioned, IRFA requires 
USCIRF to recommend and the U.S. execu-
tive branch to designate “countries of par-
ticular concern,” or CPCs. CPCs are those 
countries whose governments either engage 
in or tolerate “systematic, ongoing, egregious” 
violations of religious freedom, which IRFA 
further defines as including “(A) torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment; (B) prolonged detention without 
Inclusive Democracy in Europe60
charges; (C) causing the disappearance of per-
sons by the abduction or clandestine deten-
tion of those persons; or (D) other flagrant 
denial of the right to life, liberty, or the secu-
rity of persons.” In determining whether to 
recommend CPC designation for a particular 
country, we first collect information as to the 
religious freedom violations that are occur-
ring in that country, and then assess whether 
those violations meet the “systematic, ongo-
ing, egregious” standard. This is an exercise 
of legal, not scientific, analysis, and different 
individuals sometimes come to different con-
clusions.
There currently are eight CPCs designated by the 
Secretary of State on behalf of the President; the 
most recent designations were made in September 
2011. USCIRF agrees with these designations, and 
in its 2012 annual report recommended that eight 
other countries also should be CPCs. Table 1 at 
the end of this paper show the State Department’s 
CPC designations, USCIRF’s CPC recommenda-
tions, and the countries on USCIRF’s “Watch List,” 
where the violations engaged in or tolerated by the 
government approach, but do not meet, the CPC 
standard. Table 2 shows the actions that the State 
Department has taken pursuant to IRFA in the 
countries that it has designated as CPCs. 
Thus far, the impact of the CPC mechanism has 
been mixed, with the most progress occurring 
the first time a country receives a designation or 
recommendation. The State Department’s initial 
CPC designations of Saudi Arabia and Vietnam 
and USCIRF’s initial CPC recommendations for 
Turkmenistan and Nigeria did produce some 
positive changes in those countries. Yet Saudi 
Arabia remains a State Department CPC, and all 
four remain among USCIRF’s CPC recommenda-
tions. The eight countries currently on the State 
Department’s CPC list have been so designated 
for years.88 The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, another Congressionally-created watchdog 
agency, currently is conducting a study into the 
IRFA mechanisms’ effectiveness. It will be inter-
esting to see their conclusions regarding IRFA’s 
impact.
Of course, countries on the State Department’s 
and USCIRF’s lists are not the only countries in the 
world where religious freedom violations occur, 
and a country’s absence from USCIRF’s annual 
reports does not mean that it has no religious free-
dom problems. With USCIRF’s current size and 
structure, we have been able to address some 25 to 
30 countries in each of the past few years’ annual 
reports (a large increase from USCIRF’s first sev-
eral annual reports, which covered fewer than 10). 
The State Department’s annual international reli-
gious freedom report does include all countries.89
III. Examples of USCIRF’s Work
The following are some examples of USCIRF’s 
work on a range of countries and issues: 
USCIRF worked for a number of years with the 
State Department, members of Congress, and 
88. Burma, China, Iran, and Sudan have been State Depart-
ment CPCs since 1999; North Korea since 2002; Eri-
trea and Saudi Arabia since 2004; and Uzbekistan since 
2006. Since IRFA’s inception, two countries have been 
placed on the State Department’s CPC list and later 
removed: Iraq (1999-2002) and Vietnam (2004-2005). 
In addition, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan and the 
Milosevic regime of the Serbian Republic of Yugosla-
via were designated by the State Department as “par-
ticularly severe violators” for several years but removed 
after those regimes fell (1999-2002 for the Taliban 
regime, and 1999-2000 for the Milosevic regime).
89. See http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm.
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NGOs to increase opposition to the flawed “def-
amation of religions” resolutions at the UN.90 In 
March 2011, the “defamation” resolutions were 
replaced with UNHRC Resolution 16/18, a posi-
tive approach that focuses on fighting religious 
intolerance, discrimination, and violence without 
restricting speech.
•	 USCIRF also has worked to raise aware-
ness among non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) about UN mechanisms that provide 
venues for civil society advocacy on religious 
freedom issues, such as the Universal Periodic 
Review process and the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, 
including by holding roundtables with and 
briefings for interested NGOs.
•	 For years, USCIRF called attention, including at 
high levels of the U.S. and Saudi governments, 
to the plight of Hadi al-Mutif, an Ismaili Muslim 
jailed for apostasy in 1994. He was finally par-
doned by King Abdullah and released in early 
2012. Over the years, USCIRF also has helped 
secure the release of other religious prisoners, 
including in Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, and Vietnam, sometimes through public 
advocacy and sometimes through behind-the-
scenes work.
•	 Based on a USCIRF recommendation, Congress 
included language imposing targeted sanctions 
on human rights and religious freedom violators 
in the 2010 Iran sanctions act. This was the first 
time Iran sanctions ever specifically included 
human rights violators. President Obama has 
now imposed such sanctions (visa bans and 
asset freezes) by executive order on 13 Iranian 
officials, including 8 identified as egregious reli-
gious freedom violators by USCIRF.
90. See http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/defamation-of-reli-
gions.html
•	 Also based on a USCIRF recommendation, 
the Senate included Chechen President Ram-
zan Kadyrov on the list of gross human rights 
violators in the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law 
Accountability Act, which imposes U.S. visa 
bans and asset freezes on designated Russian 
officials. Kadyrov has engaged in abuses against 
Muslims and has been linked to politically-
motivated killings.
•	 USCIRF successfully urged the State Depart-
ment to revoke a tourist visa it had granted to 
Narendra Modi, Chief Minister of the Indian 
state of Gujarat, in 2005. A provision that IRFA 
added to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality 
Act makes inadmissible to the United States for-
eign government officials who were responsible 
for or carried out particularly severe violations 
of religious freedom. Modi has been implicated 
for failing to act to stop Hindu mob violence 
in his province in 2002 that killed thousands, 
mostly Muslims.
•	 USCIRF has highlighted the problem of reli-
gious intolerance in several countries’ educa-
tion systems. After a USCIRF report docu-
menting hateful language in Saudi government 
textbooks,91 some of the passages that promoted 
intolerance and incited violence were removed. 
More recently, USCIRF issued a study examin-
ing how Pakistan’s secular and religious educa-
tion systems teach about religious minorities.92 
The study examined textbooks in all four prov-
inces and leading madrassas, as well as con-
ducted teacher and student interviews, and 
found that intolerance is taught in Pakistani 
schools. It has become a frequently-cited refer-
ence documenting this problem.
91. See http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-
releases/2206.html.
92. See http://www.uscirf.gov/reports-and-briefs/special-
reports/3660.html.
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•	 USCIRF produced a study compiling and ana-
lyzing the constitutional provisions regarding 
religious freedom and the religion-state rela-
tionship in countries that are members of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation – first 
issued in 2005 and updated this year – as part 
of efforts to advocate for strong religious free-
dom protections in the new constitutions of 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and now the Arab Awaken-
ing countries.93
•	 USCIRF conducted a major research study 
into the U.S. government’s treatment of asylum 
seekers that found serious flaws placing asy-
lum seekers at risk of being returned to coun-
93. See http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/muslim-constitutions.html.
tries where they could face persecution, as well 
as concerns about detention conditions.94 The 
study, which was issued in 2005, made a series 
of recommendations to the responsible agen-
cies in the Departments of Homeland Security 
94. See http://www.uscirf.gov/issues/asylum-a-refugees.html. 
Under a process called “Expedited Removal,” U.S. immi-
gration officials are empowered to summarily return 
people arriving in the United States without proper 
documentation to their country of origin. As part of 
this process, asylum seekers (who often do not have 
proper documents) are detained while a determination 
is made if they have a “credible fear” of persecution. If 
credible fear is found, the case is sent to an immigra-
tion judge, and the asylum seeker may be paroled while 
the case is pending. However, if credible fear of perse-
cution is not found, the asylum seeker is put back in the 
Expedited Removal process and removed promptly.
Table 1: 2012 CPC and Watch List Countries
Countries Designated as CPCs 
by the Department of State
USCIRF Recommendations 
for CPC Designation
USCIRF 
Watch List Countries
Burma
China
Eritrea
Iran
North Korea
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Uzbekistan
Burma
China
Eritrea
Iran
North Korea
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Uzbekistan
Egypt
Iraq
Nigeria
Pakistan
Tajikistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Vietnam
Afghanistan
Belarus
Cuba
India
Indonesia
Laos
Russia
Somalia
Venezuela
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and Justice. The Department of Justice promptly 
implemented the recommendations, but the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did 
not. USCIRF continues to engage with DHS 
agencies regarding recommended reforms. In 
early 2009, DHS announced detention reforms 
that would address some of USCIRF’s concerns, 
and we are now working on a report assessing 
the implementation of those reforms. 
•	 USCIRF also has funded innovative research 
through a fellowship program.95
95. See http://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/fellowships.html.
Table 2: Actions Taken Under IRFA
The following Presidential actions under section 402(c)(1) of IRFA were approved by Secretary Clinton 
on August 18, 2011
Burma The existing, ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a).
China The existing, ongoing restrictions on exports to China of crime control and detection 
instruments and equipment, under P.L. 101-246 and the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act of 1990 and 1991.
Eritrea The existing, ongoing arms embargo referenced in 22 CFR 126.1(a). 
Iran The existing, ongoing restrictions on certain imports from and exports to Iran, in 
accordance with section 103(b) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-195).
North Korea The existing, ongoing restrictions to which North Korea is subject, pursuant to sec-
tions 402 and 209 of the Trade Act of 1974 (the Jackson-Vanik Amendment).
Sudan The restriction on making certain appropriated funds available for assistance to the 
Government of Sudan in the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, currently set forth in section 7070(f) of the 
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
2010 (Div. F, P.L. 111-117), as carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing Appropria-
tions Act, 2011 (Div. B, P.L. 112-10) and any provision of law that is the same or sub-
stantially the same as this provision.
Saudi 
Arabia & 
Uzbekistan
Waived the requirements of section 405(a) of the IRF Act with respect to Saudi Ara-
bia, and Uzbekistan, to further the purposes of the IRFA.
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Reporting 
on religious 
freedom: the 
“governmental” 
approach and 
the issue of 
legitimacy 
by PASQUALE FERRARA96
Introduction
In the general context of a growing attention 
devoted to religion in world politics, religious 
freedom is becoming increasingly relevant. Gov-
ernments are being made more and more account-
able vis-à-vis the respect of religious minorities, 
and international organisations are more reactive 
than in the recent past to the obstacles and restric-
tions that limit the enjoyment of this fundamen-
tal freedom. If religious freedom clearly consti-
tutes a new defining field for the advancement of 
human rights in relation to state behaviour, it is 
also becoming, with increasing saliency, an issue 
96. Secretary General European University Institute
that challenges the traditional diplomatic manner 
of implementing inter-state diplomacy.
In particular, a plethora of “reports” on religious 
freedom are released regularly by governments, 
international institutions, special rapporteurs and 
religious bodies. In several cases, such reporting 
activity is realised via documents specifically and 
exclusively addressing religious freedom; more 
often, religious freedom is included in the moni-
toring of human rights regulations and practices 
at the international level. In this latter case, reli-
gious freedom is not the only and exclusive sub-
ject of the monitoring activity and it represents a 
sub-set of a broader reporting activity regarding 
human rights in general. 
I. Standards, actors, 
legitimacy, policy 
In general, there are four major issues related to 
reporting on religious freedom: the definition of 
standards, the nature of the actors involved (both 
as observers and observed), legitimacy, and the 
policy consequences (changes in bilateral and mul-
tilateral relations, “reciprocity”, sanctions, travel 
advice).
The definition of standards is not an easy task. 
Some standards can be set against the general 
“codex” of human rights; other standards have 
a more limited focus, and relate to the respect 
of freedom of religion from the point of view 
of one specific faith. In the reporting activity on 
freedom of religion, the most common standard 
should be the principle of equality (the same set of 
basic rights granted to any religious organisation 
operating in a given State); in practice, what often 
seems to be implemented, especially in report-
ing activities performed by national governments 
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or religious non-governmental organisations is 
what we could call the “principle of proportional-
ity”, meaning the evaluation of the distinct place 
and impact of the different religions and religious 
institutions in a given society. 
As far as the “observers” are involved, it is not 
always easy to identify them with a specialised 
institution; more often, one rather finds a set of 
institutionalised practices of monitoring reli-
gious freedom. Such practices, “institutionalised” 
through reiteration and internal or external legiti-
macy, are performed by different agencies (gov-
ernments, international organisations, private or 
non-governmental organisations). 
Legitimacy is the crucial test that most report-
ing activities on religious freedom fail to pass. In 
particular, “national” or “confessional” reports are 
strongly contested, whereas reporting initiatives 
performed by international organisations receive 
broader acceptance. Governmental reports are 
often rejected by the states considered incompliant 
on the grounds that the monitoring activity at the 
source of the criticism is unilateral, incomplete, or 
somewhat biased. Moreover, governmental reports 
on religious freedom feed a more fundamental 
questioning of the credibility of the observers, 
especially in cases where there are records of intol-
erance in the territory of the country responsible 
for the “international” reporting activity. 
II. Current practices
As far as state-based monitoring is concerned, the 
most famous case is that of the US Commission 
on Religious Freedom. Under Section 102 (b) of 
the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) 
of 1998 the State Department Office of Interna-
tional Religious Freedom and its global network 
of  Embassies have an obligation to produce an 
annual report on religious freedom throughout 
the world. The results lead to a classification of 
states under scrutiny. According to the categories 
currently used, a government may have “generally 
respected” the right of religious freedom or may 
have engaged in or tolerated “particularly severe 
violations” of religious freedoms (in which case it 
falls within the category of “countries of particu-
lar concern”). From its side, the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (an inter-governmental 
organisation97), though its “Observatory” compiles 
yearly a report on Islamophobia98 covering issues 
such as “Incidents Related to Mosques”, “Qur’an 
Burning” in the US, and, more generally, “manifes-
tations of Islamophobia” in USA and in Europe. 
However, the report includes mentions of “con-
structive developments with regard to combating 
Islamophobia” and a direct reference to the inter-
national human rights “codex”.
With regard to the engagement of private organ-
isations and NGOs, in the “Christian” camp many 
agencies are active in reporting activities: for 
instance, “Aid to the Church in Need” (ACN)99 reg-
ularly publishes a Report on Religious Freedom100 
and a specialised survey on the situation of Chris-
tians in the Middle East. 
In the field of Hebraism, the Anti-Defamation 
League101 publishes an Annual Report, the pur-
97. http://www.oic-oci.org
98. See http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/islamphobia/
reports/english/islamphobia-report-2012.pdf
99. See International website www.acn-intl.org
100. Cf ACN, Christian and the struggle for religious free-
dom, 2012; http://www.acnuk.org/data/files/ACN_
Christians_and_the_Struggle_for_Religious_Free-
dom.pdf
101. http://www.adl.org/about-adl/
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pose of which is “combating anti-Semitism, hatred 
and bigotry”. The mission statement of the ADL 
includes the following passages: “We monitor and 
expose online hate and anti-Semitism to make 
everyone aware of hidden threats. We keep gov-
ernment out of religion and religion out of gov-
ernment— and religion flourishes. Our partner-
ships with law enforcement help us protect against 
violent extremists. (….) We help combat global 
terror by connecting American and Israeli law 
enforcement.” 102
Legitimacy is far more accepted as a natural attri-
bute when it comes to the monitoring activities 
performed by international organisations. 
At international level, a UN Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or belief103 has been appointed 
by the UN Human Rights Council. His/her man-
date is “to identify existing or emerging obstacles 
to the enjoyment of the right of freedom of reli-
gion or belief and present recommendations on 
ways and means to overcome such obstacles”.104
102. “From problem to solution, ADF annual report 
2011(http://archive.adl.org/annual_report/Annual_
Report_2011.pdf)
103. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/
Pages/FreedomReligionIndex.aspx
104. According to the Human Rights Council Resolution 
n.6/37, the Special Rapporteur must fulfil, among other 
duties, the following general goals: “ (a) To promote 
the adoption of measures at the national, regional and 
international levels to ensure the promotion and pro-
tection of the right to freedom of religion or belief; 
(b) To identify existing and emerging obstacles to the 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief 
and present recommendations on ways and means 
to overcome such obstacles; (c) To continue her/his 
efforts to examine incidents and governmental actions 
that are incompatible with the provisions of the Decla-
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief and 
to recommend remedial measures as appropriate; (d) 
To continue to apply a gender perspective, inter alia, 
through the identification of gender-specific abuses, in 
The working method of the Special Rapporteur 
relies fundamentally on the cooperation of State 
governments, which are also his/her main inter-
locutors for addressing cases of violations of the 
right to religious freedom. In practice, the Special 
Rapporteur transmits appeals and letters of allega-
tion to States with regard to cases that represent 
infringements of or impediments to the exercise 
of the right of religion and belief; he/she also 
undertakes fact-finding country visits and sub-
mits annual reports to the Human Rights Council 
and to the General Assembly. 
In the EU Report on Human Rights105 prepared by 
the EEAS, one paragraph of the section “Thematic 
Issues” is devoted to the Freedom of thought, con-
science and religion or belief. However, the topic 
is present in several EU Parliament Resolutions, 
in EU Council “Conclusions” and in important 
speeches delivered by prominent EU institutional 
leaders. 
In terms of policy consequences, it seems that 
reports originating from governmental monitor-
ing activities are more effective. However, such a 
result comes at the expenses of legitimacy; one 
may argue that there is a clear trade-off between 
the wide acceptance of a report on religious free-
dom and the policy implications built on its con-
clusions. This is due, however, more to the limited 
supra-national powers of the international insti-
tution concerned than to the “credibility” of the 
report itself. In a way, “national” or intergovern-
mental reports are “documents with teeth”, whereas 
international reports are “documents with trust”. 
the reporting process, including in information collec-
tion and in recommendations”. 
105. See 2011 edition: http://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/
docs/2011_hr_report_en.pdf
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III. A case study: The Italian 
“Observatory on Religious 
Freedom” 
Traditionally the Italian Foreign Policy after 
World War II, during the Christian-Democrat led 
governments, has not articulated in an explicit 
manner the issue of religious freedom as a lead-
ing topic of international relations. This does not 
mean, however, that Italian foreign policy ignored 
the issue; rather, religious freedom was “embed-
ded” in the Italian approach to North Africa and 
the Middle East, as one of the many aspects of 
the Italian “projection” in the Mediterranean. In 
this domain, Italian foreign policy was more the 
expression of complex domestic dynamics than 
the result of the influence of the Cold War. 
At any rate, there was a mediated rather than a 
direct approach to religious freedom. The issue 
was considered a political one, to be dealt with 
through the traditional channels of foreign policy, 
rather than a subject relevant to the framework 
of the increasing “globalisation” and sometimes 
“multilateralisation” of human rights. Rather than 
a matter of principle, it was a question of politi-
cal realism, prudent foreign policy and respon-
sible attitude. Religious freedom was not seen as 
a normative question, but rather as the result of 
pragmatic and subtle initiatives in the bilateral 
relations of Italy with Middle Eastern Countries. 
A very different model was followed by the Italian 
foreign policy with the Eastern European Coun-
tries in the Warsaw Pact bloc, where the issue was 
considered intractable, at least until the election of 
Pope John Paul II. 
In Africa, religious freedom often took the form of 
protecting Catholic Missionaries and their initia-
tives. 
This approach was implemented rather forcefully 
under the Christian Democratic Governments, in 
particular during the era of Andreotti (who was 
Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs several times from the early ‘70s 
until the early ’90s). 
With the end of the Cold War, religious freedom 
surfaced in a different way as a specific subject of 
foreign policy. However, within the Italian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, religions were not seen as 
part of the fundamental challenges of interna-
tional relations until recent times. The Catholic 
religion was long considered an asset for the Ital-
ian Foreign Policy, since the country was inevi-
tably regarded abroad as the host of the Vatican 
and home for the Holy Father. The presence of old 
and strong Catholic “minorities” in the Middle 
East and North Africa, in particular, was seen as 
an important tool for strengthening the role of the 
country in the region. 
A fundamental change occurred after 9/11 and 
the launching of the so-called “global war on ter-
ror” during the first Presidential term of George 
W. Bush. The political turn to the right taken by 
the Italian politics with the Premiership of Silvio 
Berlusconi seemed to encourage a sort of neo-
conservative interpretation of religion as a prob-
lem rather than as a part of the solution, with a 
special emphasis on radical Islam and its more 
violent and intolerant expressions. However, this 
particular approach regarding the place of religion 
in foreign policy was never endorsed, as such, by 
the Italian diplomatic service, which maintained 
a more realistic and concerned attitude based on 
the pursuit of the fundamental interests of the 
country in the area. The assertive tone on religious 
freedom often used by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Franco Frattini was, consequently, a com-
bination of an internal and legitimate ideologi-
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cal agenda, a genuine concern for the respect of a 
fundamental human rights and an issue related to 
the role of Italy in the region. In this context, the 
narrative on religious freedom was fundamentally 
based upon the concept of “protecting” Christian 
minorities, although officially the rationale was 
the advancement of religious freedom as a univer-
sal value. The issue of protection was also viewed 
with some concern in the Vatican, since it seemed 
to give some foundation to the accusation that the 
Christians in the Middle East were acting as “for-
eigners”, despite the fact that they had been living 
on the land for centuries and well before the birth 
of Islam. Moreover, the emphasis on religious free-
dom ran the risk of being counterproductive and 
self-defeating, insofar as there were parties in the 
Coalition of the centre-right (such as Lega Nord) 
that showed forms of intolerance against Mus-
lims and their religious practices, especially when 
the construction of Mosques on Italian soil was 
at stake. In particular, the argument of “reciproc-
ity” (freedom of religion for the Christians in the 
Middle East in exchange of freedom of religion for 
the Muslim minorities in Europe and Italy) under-
mined the universality of the claim in favour of 
freedom of religion as a fundamental right (and, 
as such, not subject, by definition, to conditional-
ity and pre-conditions). 
In this context, the role played by professional 
diplomats was crucial to keeping the issue of reli-
gious freedom on track as a new field of the Italian 
foreign policy, without yielding to a faith-based 
diplomatic approach. The role of the Directorate 
for Political and Security Affairs was relevant and 
diplomats contributed in an intelligent manner to 
the aim of crafting an Italian approach to the topic 
in the broader framework of global human rights 
advocacy. Several initiatives were also taken in 
international fora (such as the United Nations), in 
cooperation with relevant partners (for instance, 
Spain, Jordan, and Indonesia). A good opportunity 
was provided by the creation, in the French Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, of a special unit (“Pôle Reli-
gions”) in charge of religious issues106. The Policy 
Planning Unit of the Farnesina decided, in turn, 
with the support of the leadership of the Ministry, 
to launch in 2009 a new domain of policy-oriented 
research, the general goal of which was to analyse 
the role of religions in international relations. It 
was in this broader context that the issue of reli-
gious freedom was to be addressed by Italian (pro-
fessional) diplomacy, leaving the more vocal advo-
cacy of “protection” of Christians in the Middle 
East to politicians. The Policy Planning Unit orga-
nizes, together with the Milan-based Italian think 
tank “ISPI” and the Province of Trento, an annual 
seminar on this topic, held in October, hosting 
activists, policy makers, academics and diplomats. 
Other events were created in cooperation with 
“Religions for Peace” and the European University 
Institute in Florence, which hosted a conference 
on religious freedom co-sponsored by the Italian 
and Spanish Foreign Ministries, with the partici-
pation of the Ministers of both countries (Franco 
Frattini and Trinidad Jiménez)107. An international 
workshop on “Promoting Religious Freedom and 
Peaceful Coexistence” was recently organised by 
the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ISPI108. 
Those initiatives ran in parallel with more sym-
bolic actions sponsored by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs himself. For instance, Foreign Minister 
106. See Joseph Maïla, Pourquoi un pôle “Religions” au Quai 
d’Orsay (http://www.delegfrance-conseil-europe.org/
spip.php?article431)
107. See article by Franco Frattini and Trinidad Jiménez 
in the Italian newspaper «Avvenire », 18 June 2011 
(http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/Archivi-
oNotizie/Interviste/2011/06/20110620_liberta_religi-
osa.htm)
108. In Rome, 11.2.2013
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Franco Frattini received on 26 January 2011 the 
“Italy for Asia Bibi: freedom, justice and human 
rights” Committee, an informal grouping of asso-
ciations that has sprung up to defend Asia Bibi, 
the Christian Pakistani woman condemned to 
death for blasphemy and to the release of whom 
Minister Frattini was strongly committed. After 
the cruel assassination of the Pakistani Minister 
Shahbaz Bhatti, a huge banner with Bhatti’s image 
and name was placed outside of the Italian For-
eign Ministry in March 2011, to commemorate 
the man and to affirm the commitment of Italian 
diplomacy to the defence of religious freedom in 
the world. 
For his part, Minister Terzi was very vocal in con-
demning the series of “hate-driven attacks” against 
Christians at worship in Nigeria.109 On 27 Septem-
ber 2012 Minister Terzi, together with the Jorda-
nian foreign minister Nasser Judeh, co-chaired 
an international conference “on civil society and 
human rights education as a tool for disseminat-
ing religious tolerance”, in the margins of the UN 
General Assembly. The event aimed “to foster reli-
gious tolerance and the defence of freedom of reli-
gion and beliefs (FORB) and religious minorities”. 
110 15 foreign ministers and high-level delegates 
participated, including the High Commissioner 
for Human rights, Mr. Pillay, along with 39 civil 
society delegations.
A more structural approach to the freedom of 
religion in terms of reporting activities has been 
recently attempted by the Italian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs with the creation of an “Observatory 
109. See press release http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_
Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Comunicati/2012/10/20121029_
attentatoNigeria.htm
110. See press release http://www.esteri.it/MAE/
EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondi-
menti/2012/09/20120928_AssembleaGeneraleOnu.htm
on Religious Freedom”. According to the official 
statement released on the day of the presenta-
tion of the initiative, “following the lead of the 
United States, Canada and other countries, Italy 
too has set up an Observatory on Religious Free-
dom to monitor and combat violations of religious 
freedom around the world, beginning with the 
areas at risk where religious minorities are being 
persecuted.”111 The Observatory was established by 
the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the City 
of Rome and is run by a coordinator, the sociolo-
gist Massimo Introvigne, and four other members: 
two diplomats specialised in the field of Human 
Rights, and two representatives from NGOs. Min-
ister Terzi and Mayor Alemanno signed a Protocol 
of Understanding at the Foreign Ministry in Janu-
ary 2012 to establish the Observatory.
“The Observatory – according to the official mis-
sion statement - was conceived in 2011 after the 
wave of attacks against Christian communities in 
the Middle East. Its aim was to create – together 
with our Representation to the Holy See – a body 
dedicated to intensifying the efforts of Italy and 
the international community in protecting reli-
gious minorities.”112 The rationale provided for 
the establishment of the Observatory is the fol-
lowing: “The promotion of religious freedom in all 
its forms, and the protection of religious minori-
ties throughout the world, are a priority of Italy’s 
foreign policy and its ethical dimension. This key 
strand of our country’s international activities has 
recently gained an even higher profile in the wake 
of the horrific episodes of violence against Chris-
tian communities in the African continent. (…) 
111. http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/Archivi-
oNotizie/Approfondimenti/2012/06/20120622_Roma.
htm
112. http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/AreaGior-
nalisti/NoteStampa/2012/07/20120717_NotaServizio-
Nigeria.htm
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The world looks to our capital city as a beacon of 
dialogue and tolerance among religious faiths; as 
the seat of Christianity’s greatest basilica and the 
biggest mosque in Europe; and as the home of the 
world’s oldest Jewish community.”113 
However, the mission of the Observatory remains 
unclear. The new body is expected to collect, check 
and release information on violations of religious 
freedom in the world, but no precise indication 
thus far exists regarding the possible compilation 
of an official and public report based on input 
received by the Italian diplomatic network. More-
over, no direct policy consequences seem to be 
attached to the violation of religious freedoms, 
other than those possibly taken through diplo-
matic channels and at EU or UN level. Apparently, 
according to a recent statement by the coordina-
tor, Massimo Introvigne, the role of Italy should 
be that of “coalition building” in order to inter-
vene “sometimes in public, sometimes discretely” 
in cases where the freedom of religion is threat-
ened.114 The very nature of the Observatory there-
fore needs to be clarified. The presence of pro-
fessional diplomats on the Board makes if very 
different, for instance, from the US Commission 
on International Religious Freedom, since the lat-
ter is composed of independent commissioners 
appointed by Congress and by the President. Dip-
lomats should deal with religion as a fundamen-
tal matter in international relations and for the 
advancement of human rights; they should not be 
directly involved, however, in reporting activities 
sponsored by their governments rather than those 
backed by international organisations, since it is 
almost impossible to separate such activities from 
a national foreign policy agenda based both on 
values and interests.
113. Ibidem
114. http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNo-
tizie/Approfondimenti/2012/06/20120622_Roma.htm
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